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This Article suggests the time is ripe for the United States
Supreme Court to interpret the fair use defense of free speech
or parody under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection
Act (ACPA). Congress enacted the ACPA in 1999 to protect
consumers from “cybersquatting,” which occurs when a nontrademark holder registers domain names of trademarks and:
(1) tries to sell the names back to the trademark holder for a
ransom;1 (2) tries to sell the names to the highest bidder;2 or (3)
uses the names to divert business and consumers from the
trademark holder’s website to the non-trademark holder’s website to increase revenue.
Although published decisions from the circuit courts interpreting the ACPA continue to explore the marriage of trademark protection with the First Amendment’s protections of domain names and websites as free speech, conflicting criteria
have emerged regarding when an alleged cybersquatter can
successfully assert the fair use defense. For example, the Tenth
Circuit’s standard is that it must be immediately apparent to
anyone visiting a parodic website that it was not the trademark
owner’s website. The Fourth Circuit’s criterion, however, is
whether the domain name at issue conveys two simultaneous,
yet contradictory, messages: that it is the original and that it is
not the original and is instead a parody. Such inconsistent criteria have the potential to render an alleged cybersquatter victorious in one circuit, yet liable in another.
This Article’s circuit-by-circuit analysis exposes the vast
inconsistencies among the circuit courts’ decisions and argues
that the United States Supreme Court should, by granting certiorari, articulate the standard for the ACPA’s fair use defense
based on free speech or parody.
I. INTRODUCTION
The twenty-first century of daily, required use of technolo1. See Panavision Int’l L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
2. S. REP. NO. 106–140, at 5 (1999). See DaimlerChrysler v. Net Inc.,
388 F.3d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s
Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 493 (2d Cir. 2000)).
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gy has led to the registration of endless Internet domain names
to advertise, market, and sell business products and services.
In 1999, Congress passed the ACPA as a legislative tool to protect consumers from cybersquatting, which occurs when a nontrademark holder registers domain names of trademarks and:
(1) tries to sell the names back to the trademark holder for a
ransom;3 (2) tries to sell the names to the highest bidder;4 or (3)
uses the names to divert business and consumers from the
trademark holder’s website to the non-trademark holder’s website to increase revenue.5
The ACPA prohibits cybersquatting.6 It provides in part
that “[a] person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a
mark . . . if . . . that person (i) has a bad faith intent to profit
from that mark . . . and (ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that . . . is identical or confusingly similar to that
mark.”7 ACPA proponents regard this provision as a helpful
sword in protecting the marks of registered trademark owners
who spend years and money developing the reputation and
goodwill of their products or services. By contrast, critics of the
ACPA view it as a significant curtailment of free speech rights,
especially when a domain name or website is used to criticize or
parody another individual or company.
Despite the clear prohibition in the ACPA, cybersquatting
litigation has continued to occur in the federal district courts.
In 2003, there were only ten published decisions from the federal appellate courts8 interpreting the ACPA. These decisions
have created inconsistent and conflicting criteria regarding
when an alleged cybersquatter can successfully use a fair use
defense of free speech or parody to avoid liability under the
3. See Panavision Int’l L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
4. S. REP. NO. 106–140, at 5 (1999). See DaimlerChrysler v. Net Inc.,
388 F.3d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s
Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 493 (2d Cir. 2000)).
5. S. REP. NO. 106–140, at 6. The ACPA “was Congress’ response to an
onslaught of e-savvy entrepreneurs who amassed domain names incorporating
protected trademarks for their own exploitations via sale or use.” Harrods Ltd.
v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 157 F. Supp. 2d 658, 664 (E.D. Va. 2001).
Cybersquatters often register domain names because they profit from increased traffic on their own websites due to advertising income or an agreement with a provider who pays them based on how many hits are received on
their website.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A) (2006).
7. Id.
8. The author uses the terms “federal appellate courts” and “circuit
courts” interchangeably.
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ACPA.9
Section II of this Article describes the interplay between
the Lanham Act, which is the broader federal trademark infringement statute, and the ACPA. This section also explains
how Congress enacted the ACPA to protect consumers from cybersquatters. Section III explains the fair use defense of free
speech and parody prior to and under ACPA. Section IV is a
comprehensive circuit-by-circuit analysis of published decisions
involving an alleged cybersquatter who has asserted a fair use
defense based upon free speech or parody in an ACPA case.
Section V concludes that the time is ripe for the United States
Supreme Court to interpret the standard regarding when a fair
use defense of free speech or parody will preclude liability under the ACPA.
II. TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT UNDER THE LANHAM
ACT AND THE ACPA.
A. TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT UNDER THE LANHAM ACT
Congress enacted the Lanham Act in 1946 to prevent
“commercial use of trademarks and tradenames likely to cause
confusion as to the source of a product or service.”10 However, it
9. Sue Ann Mota, The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act: An
Analysis of the Decisions from the Courts of Appeals, 21 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 355, 358 (2003). These cases included: N. Light
Tech., Inc. v. N. Lights Club, 236 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2001); Sallen v. Corinthians
Licenciamentos LTDA, 273 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2001); Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v.
Sportsman’s Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489 (2d Cir. 2000); Shields v. Zuccarini, 254
F.3d 476 (3d Cir. 2001); Harrods, 302 F.3d 214; Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v.
Porsche.net, 302 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2002); People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001); Virtual Works, Inc. v.
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 238 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2001); Bird v. Parsons, 289
F.3d 865 (6th Cir. 2002); Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 304
F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2002).
10. HER v. RE/MAX First Choice, 468 F. Supp. 2d 964, 967 (S.D. Ohio
2007). The Lanham Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125, provides in part:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol,
or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which-(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive
as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his
or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person,
or
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was not meant to prohibit the use of a mark to communicate an
idea or express a point of view. If a person can demonstrate
that her use of a mark qualifies as fair use,11 such as free
speech or a parody, she will not be liable under the Lanham
Act.12
B . THE ACPA AS A CONSUMER PROTECTION TOOL TO COMBAT
CYBERSQUATTING.
After the 1946 enactment of the Lanham Act, but prior to
the ACPA’s enactment in 1999, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act was the weapon of choice against cybersquatting.13 The
Internet explosion in the 1990s had prompted businesses and
individuals to turn to the world wide web14 to offer their products online with accompanying “information about their products in a much more detailed fashion than [could] be done
through a standard advertisement.”15 Therefore, the need for

(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the
nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or
her or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he
or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2006).
11. For example, the Lanham Act provides that the following cannot be
the basis for a claim of dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment: “[a]ny
fair use, including a nominative or descriptive fair use, or facilitation of such
fair use, of a famous mark by another person other than as a designation of
source for the person's own goods or services, including use in connection with
(i) advertising or promotion that permits consumers to compare goods or services; or (ii) identifying and parodying, criticizing, or commenting upon the
famous mark owner or the goods or services of the famous mark owner.” 15
U.S.C. § 1125(C)(3)(A) (2006).
12. HER, Inc. v. RE/MAX First Choice, LLC, 468 F. Supp. 2d 964, 967
(S.D. Ohio 2007) (citing Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900
(9th Cir. 2002)).
13. See Mota, supra note 9, at 356; see also Federal Trademark Dilution
Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(C) (2006); S. REP. NO. 106–140, at 7 (1999).
14. The use of “www” that appears on the left side of a domain name and
precedes domain names signifies that the characters to its right are a domain
name. See PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
EXAMINATION GUIDE NO. 2-99, MARKS COMPOSED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, OF
DOMAIN
NAMES
I
(1999),
http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/resources/exam/guide299.jsp (“. . . the average person familiar with the Internet recognizes the format for a domain name
and understands that . . . ‘www’ [is] a part of every URL.”).
15. Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 493 (2d
Cir. 2000) (“For consumers to buy things or gather information on the Internet, they need an easy way to find particular companies or brand names.”).
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an easy-to-find domain name,16 the web address that a user
types in to access a particular Internet website, became a necessity.17
Companies often used their corporate name as their website (for example, Microsoft uses www.microsoft.com) for three
reasons: (1) to make consumers’ searches for a website as easy
as possible because uncertain customers may guess that a particular company’s website can be located by correctly18 typing
in the company’s name as a domain name;19 (2) to discourage
consumers from giving up on the search for a company’s web16. The ACPA defines a domain name as “any alphanumeric designation
which is registered with or assigned by any domain name registrar, domain
name registry, or other domain name registration authority as part of an electronic address on the Internet.” H.R. REP. NO. 106–412, at 4 (1999). Domain
names generally consist of two parts: a top level extension, such as .com or
.org, and a second level extension, such as “pepsi” in pepsi.com. See Jian Xiao,
The First Wave of Cases Under the ACPA, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 159,
164–65 (2002). See generally Sporty’s Farm, 202 F.3d at 492 (stating that, as of
February 2, 2000, the Internet was generally divided into six types of top-level
domains: (1) .edu for educational institutions; (2) .org for nongovernmental
and noncommercial organizations; (3) .gov for governmental entities; (4) .net
for networks; (5) .com for commercial users; and (6) a nation-specific domain
(e.g, .us for the United States)). An explanation of Internet terminology also
appears at http://www.verisign.com/nds/naming/glossary (last visited November 25, 2009).
17. See Xiao, supra note 16, at 159.
18. Some cybersquatters purposely register “a common misspelling of
another’s trademark with the intent of diverting Internet users seeking the
mark owner’s website to the infringer’s website.” Timothy Marsh, Shields v.
Zuccarini: The Role of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act in
Fighting Typosquatting, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 683, 683 (2002).
19. Panavision Int’l L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1327 (9th Cir. 1998)
(quoting Cardservice Int’l v. McGee, 950 F. Supp. 737, 741 (E.D. Va. 1997));
see also Beverly v. Network Solutions, Inc., No. C-98-0337-VRW, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8888, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 12, 1998). In fact, “[o]ne of the cardinal rules for domain names is ‘keep it short’[because a] shorter domain name is
easier to remember.” ROBERT A. BADGLEY, DOMAIN NAME DISPUTES § 2:09[A]
(Aspen Publishers 2002). Moreover, an Internet user who does not know a
company’s domain name will likely use a search engine to find all the web
pages on the Internet containing a particular word or phrase, such as the
company’s name. This search usually produces a lengthy list of websites for
the user to look through to find a particular website. See Sporty’s Farm, 202
F.3d at 493; see also H.R. REP. NO. 106–412, at 5 (1999). Thus, many “website
owners have a great incentive to use any means necessary to appear prominently on many keyword searches, including filling their sites with keywords
that are in no way relevant to their site’s subject matter.” Robert Nupp, Concurrent Use of Trademarks on the Internet: Reconciling the Concept of Geographically Delimited Trademarks with the Reality of the Internet, 64 OHIO ST.
L. J. 617, 658 (2003) (footnote omitted).
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site if they do not believe a company has a website;20 and (3) to
improve consumer recognition and goodwill by alerting consumers as to which company owns a particular website.21
When the ACPA22 amended the Lanham Act in 1999, it
generally provided that “a trademark owner asserting a claim
under the ACPA must establish the following: (1) it has a valid
trademark entitled to protection; (2) its mark is distinctive or
famous; (3) the defendant’s domain name is identical or confusingly similar to,23 or in the case of famous marks, dilutive of,
the owner’s mark; (4) the defendant used, registered, or trafficked in the domain name; (5) with a bad faith intent to profit.”24 The ACPA was intended to protect consumers unknowingly diverted to a cybersquatter’s website, so that they are not
confused as to the true source or sponsorship of goods and services on a website. It also aimed to protect the value of business
brand names and trademarks by preventing the loss of revenue25 and consumer confidence when consumers are diverted to

20. Panavision Int’l,141 F.3d at 1327 (quoting Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky,
993 F. Supp. 282, 306–07 (D.N.J. 1998)).
21. Id. at 1327 n.8 (citing Cardservice Int’l, 950 F. Supp. at 741). After all,
“[t]he property interest in a mark that trademark law seeks to protect is consumer recognition—preferably favorable recognition (i.e., goodwill).” Nupp,
supra note 19, at 618; see, e.g., J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:30 (4th ed. 2000).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A) (2006).
23. Courts typically analyze the second level extension domain, such as
“cocacola” in “cocacola.com” when analyzing whether that domain name is
“identical or confusingly similar to a given mark” for ACPA purposes. Virtual
Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am. Inc., 238 F.3d 264, 270 (4th Cir. 2001).
24. DaimlerChrysler v. The Net Inc., 388 F.3d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 2004)
(citing Ford Motor Co. v. Catalonette, 342 F.3d 543, 546 (6th Cir. 2003)).
25. S. REP. NO. 106–140, at 6 (1999). The House of Representatives also
explained that:
Cyberpiracy can hurt businesses in a number of ways. First, a cyberpirate’s expropriation of a mark as part of a domain name prevents
the trademark owner from using the mark as part of its domain
name. As a result, consumers seeking a trademark owner’s Web site
are diverted elsewhere, which means lost business opportunities for
the trademark owner. A cyberpirate’s use may also blur the distinctive quality of a mark and, when linked to certain types of Internet
activities such as pornography, may also tarnish the mark. Finally,
businesses are required to police and enforce their trademark rights
by preventing unauthorized use, or risk losing those rights entirely.
H.R. REP. NO. 106-412 (1999); see also Virtual Works, 238 F.3d at 267 (citing
Sporty’s Farm, L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Mkt. Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 493 (2d Cir.
2000) (“Cybersquatting is profitable because while it is inexpensive for a cybersquatter to register the mark of an established company as a domain name,
such companies are often vulnerable to being forced into paying substantial
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a cybersquatter’s website.26 However, the ACPA was not meant
to “give companies the right to fence off every possible combination of letters that bears any similarity to a protected
mark … .”27
III. THE FAIR USE DEFENSE OF FREE SPEECH OR
PARODY PRIOR TO THE ACPA.
To hold a cybersquatter liable under the ACPA, a court
must determine that a domain name holder had a bad faith intent to profit from the mark.28 The ACPA lists nine, nonexhaustive factors29 to assist courts in their determination of
whether a bad faith intent to profit existed.30 The fourth bad

sums to get their names back.”).
26. Cybersquatters often damage marks by putting harmful material,
such as pornography, on a website to increase the probability that they will
get a hefty ransom from the mark owner who does not want its mark damaged. When the Senate was contemplating the ACPA, they were informed
about a child who accidentally typed in www.dosney.com, instead of
www.disney.com, on the Internet and pulled up a pornography website. See
H.R. REP. NO. 106–412 at 5 (explaining the purpose and providing a summary of the Act).
27. See Virtual Works, 238 F.3d at 271; see also Audi AG v. D’Amato, 469
F.3d 534, 543 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding that Telescan’s domain names, such as
www.peterbiltnewstruck.com had the same appearance as PACCAR’s domain
name www.peterbilt.com despite the addition of characters to the domain
name because the added characters did not “eliminate the likelihood of confusion for ACPA purposes”) (quoting PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs. L.L.C.,
319 F.3d 243, 252 (6th Cir.2003) overruled in part by KP Permanent Make-Up,
Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004)). The court also noted
that the ACPA was meant to “prevent the expropriation of protected marks in
cyberspace and to abate the consumer confusion resulting therefrom.” Virtual
Works, 238 F.3d at 271.
28. At least one circuit court has determined that the standard for proving
“bad faith” is by a preponderance of the evidence. Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 225 (4th Cir. 2002). The Fourth Circuit reasoned that “[b]ecause Congress spelled out the bad faith factors so thoroughly,
we expect that Congress would have explicitly imposed a heightened burden of
proof had it intended for one to apply.” Id. at 227.
29. The ACPA provides nine factors that may be considered in determining whether a cybersquatter has a “bad faith intent to profit” from a mark. 15
U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i) (2006).
30. These nine “factors are given to courts as a guide, not as a substitute
for careful thinking about whether the conduct at issue is motivated by a bad
faith intent to profit.” Lucas Nursery & Landscaping, Inc. v. Grosse, 359 F.3d
806, 811 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Harrods, 302 F.3d at 234 (“[T]here is no simple formula for evaluating and weighing these factors . . . courts do not simply
count up which party has more factors in its favor after the evidence is in.”).
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faith factor, known as the “fair use defense,” provides that the
domain name holder’s “bona fide noncommercial or fair use of
the mark in a site accessible under the domain name” be considered by a court.31 The fair use defense was enacted to protect
permissible First Amendment speech, such as comparative advertising, comment, criticism, parody, and news reporting.32
The fair use defense also has a second basis in the ACPA’s
safe harbor exception, which provides that a bad faith intent to
profit “shall not be found in any case in which the court determines that the person believed and had reasonable grounds to
believe that the use of the domain name was a fair use or otherwise lawful.”33 Thus, if an accused cybersquatter asserts the
fair use defense, a court must consider such defense twice in its
judicial analysis: first, under the fair use defense governing
whether he or she had a bad faith intent to profit from the
mark and second, under the ACPA’s safe harbor exception.34
Long before Congress enacted the ACPA into law, parodies
were recognized as “a form of artistic expression, protected by

31. Regarding the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, “‘noncommercial use’
refers to a use that consists entirely of noncommercial, or fully constitutionally
protected, speech.” Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 905 (9th
Cir. 2002); see H.R. REP. NO. 106–412, at 11 (1999). The House of Representatives, in enacting the ACPA, further explained that “the use of a domain
name for purposes of comparative advertising, comment, criticism, parody,
news reporting, etc., even where done for profit, would not alone satisfy the
bad-faith intent requirement . . . . This factor is not intended to create a loophole that otherwise might swallow the bill, however, by allowing a domain
name registrant to evade application of the Act by merely putting up a noninfringing site under an infringing domain name.” Id.
32. Some have argued that the ACPA itself violates the First Amendment.
See E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs Ltd., 286 F.3d 270, 277 (5th Cir.
2002). In E. & J. Gallo, Spider Webs argued on appeal that the ACPA was unconstitutional because it violated the First Amendment, but since it failed to
raise this issue before the trial court, the Fifth Circuit determined that the
issue had been waived. Id. at 277, n. 4. Other courts have addressed the competing interests of the First Amendment and the ACPA. See Lamparello v.
Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 313 (4th Cir. 2005) (“Congress left little doubt that it
did not intend for trademark laws to impinge the First Amendment rights of
critics and commentators.”); see also Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain
Names, 157 F. Supp. 2d 658, 673 (E.D. Va. 2001) (“To ensure that speech protected by the First Amendment is not jeopardized by the ACPA, a court should
consider a registrant's ‘legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the mark in a
website that is accessible under the domain name at issue’” (citing 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 1125(d)(B)(i)(IV) (West Supp. 2000)).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2006).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) (2006).
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the First Amendment,” that deserved considerable freedom35
but can depend on a lack of confusion to be effective.36 A good
trademark parody creates “little likelihood of confusion, since
the humor lies in the difference between the original and the
parody.”37 An unsuccessful parody is one that requires a user to
read a website’s content before the user discovers that the domain name was meant to be a parody.38 In other words, in a
trademark infringement case, courts generally consider whether a consumer would, from the first moment, realize that Product A was not Product B in her analysis of whether something
is a parody is successful. This determines if the attempted parody falls under the umbrella of the fair use defense, which circumvents liability.39
Prior to the ACPA, parodists had historically been successful in the First, Second, and Tenth Circuits in trademark infringement actions. In L.L. Bean v. Drake Publishing, Inc., 811
F.2d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1987), Plaintiff L.L. Bean (L.L. Bean) was
a mail order catalog publisher that marketed outdoor and
sports apparel40 who sued Drake Publishing, Inc. (Drake) for
alleged trademark infringement and dilution after Drake published a parodic catalog titled “L.L. Beam’s Sex-Catalog” that
contained sexual entertainment.41 Although the district court
denied L.L. Bean’s request for a temporary restraining order, it
issued an injunction and subsequently granted summary judg35. Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, Inc., 886
F.2d 490, 493 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing Berlin v. E.C. Publ’ns, Inc., 329 F.2d 541,
545 (2d Cir. 1964)). Congress envisioned that the ACPA would balance the interests of trademark owners with the interests of domain name registrants
engaged in traditional free speech such as criticism, comment, and news reporting. S. REP. NO. 106–140, at 10.
36. Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prod., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 503 (2d
Cir. 1996).
37. Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959,
970 (10th Cir. 1996); see also OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F.
Supp. 2d 176, 191 (W.D.N.Y. 2000).
38. Morrison & Foerster LLP v. Wick, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1134–35 (D.
Colo. 2000).
39. Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 496–97. After all, the Lanham Act did not require that “the cover of a parody carry a disclaimer that it is not produced by
the subject of the parody.” Id. at 496.
40. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 27–34 (1st Cir.
1987) (“L.L. Bean II”).
41. See id. at 27. L.L. Bean also sued Drake for unfair competition, deceptive trade practices, interference with prospective business advantage, and
trade libel. Id.
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ment in L.L. Bean’s favor on the trademark dilution claim.42
The district court found that: (1) Drake’s parodic catalog had
undermined L.L. Bean’s trademark’s goodwill and reputation
such that it tarnished the marks; and (2) the publication of
Drake’s catalog had harmed L.L. Bean.43 While Drake argued
that its catalog was a parody, the district court disagreed, finding that a “parody per se is not protected from [an] injunction
under the antidilution statute.”44 Therefore, the district court
issued an injunction prohibiting future publication or distribution of the L.L. Beam Sex Catalog.45
On appeal, the First Circuit analyzed whether enjoining
Drake’s parodic catalog violated the First Amendment46 and
found that:
[Drake’s] parody constitutes an editorial or artistic, rather than a
commercial, use of [L.L. Bean’s] mark. The article was labeled as
“humor” and “parody” in the magazine’s table of contents section; it
took up two pages in a one-hundred-page issue; neither the article nor
appellant’s trademark was featured on the front or back cover of the
magazine. Drake did not use [L.L.] Bean’s mark to identify or promote goods or services to consumers; it never intended to market the
“products” displayed in the parody.47

Therefore, the First Circuit reversed the injunction and
summary judgment award against Drake, because “[d]enying
parodists the opportunity to poke fun at symbols and names
which have become woven into the fabric of our daily life, would
constitute a serious curtailment of a protected form of expression.”48
A few months later, in Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Hogg
Wyld, Ltd, the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court’s judgment in favor of Defendants who made “Lardashe” jeans featuring a pig head logo for larger women. Plaintiff, a maker of “Jordache” jeans featuring a horse head, argued that the
“Lardashe” jeans closely resembled its own and sued Defendants for allegedly violating the Lanham Act.49 The district
42. See id. L.L. Bean’s trademark dilution claim was asserted under
Maine law. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1530 (1981). Id.; see also L.L. Bean
v. Drake Publishers, 625 F. Supp. 1531 (D. Me. 1986) rev’d 811 F.2d 26 (1st
Cir. 1987) (“L.L. Bean I”).
43. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Pub., Inc., 625 F. Supp. 1531 (D. Me. 1986).
44. L.L. Bean I at 1536 (emphasis in original).
45. Id. at 1539.
46. L.L. Bean II at 28.
47. L.L. Bean II at 32.
48. L.L. Bean II at 34.
49. Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir.
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court entered judgment for Defendants because there was “no
likelihood of confusion between the Jordache trademark and
the Lardashe trademark” and Defendant’s “intent was to employ a name that, to some extent, parodied or played upon the
established trademark Jordache.”50
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
judgment in favor of Defendants while enunciating the criteria
for a successful parody to preclude liability under the Lanham
Act:
[A] parody is an attempt ‘to derive benefit from the reputation’ of the
owner of the mark . . . if only because no parody could be made without the initial mark. The benefit to the one making the parody, however, arises from the humorous association, not from public confusion
as to the source of the marks. A parody relies upon a difference from
the original mark, presumably a humorous difference, in order to produce its desired effect.51

The Second Circuit subsequently held that a parody that
causes only a “slight” risk of confusion is also protected by free
speech and will not form the basis for a Lanham Act violation.52
In Cliffs Notes v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group,
886 F.2d 490, 492–93 (2d Cir. 1989), Plaintiff Cliffs Notes
(Cliffs Notes), a publisher of condensed study guides, sought an
injunction and other relief against Defendant Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc. (Bantam) after Bantam distributed a paperback titled “Spy Notes” which was a parody of,
and satirized, the Cliffs Notes study guides.53 Cliffs Notes argued that Bantam’s actions violated the Lanham Act.54 The district court granted a preliminary injunction against Bantam,
finding that since there existed “a profound likelihood of confu1987). Jordache also sued Defendants under the New Mexico Trademark Act,
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-3-1 to 57-3-14 (1987) and common law. Jordache, 828
F.2d at 1484. Their Lanham Act claims were based on 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–
1127. Id. at 1484.
50. Id. at 1483, 1485 (emphasis added). The court also noted that the
standard under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) was whether the unauthorized use of a reproduction, copy, or imitation of a registered trademark
was “likely to cause confusion” with the registered trademark. Id. at 1484.
51. Id. at 1486 (quoting Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417,
431 (5th Cir. 1984)).
52. Cliffs Notes. Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, 886 F. 2d
490 (2d Cir. 1989).
53. Id. at 491–92.
54. Cliffs Notes also asserted that Bantam violated the New York common
law of unfair competition and § 368-d of the New York General Business Law.
Id. at 493.

LAMPKE LF CHECK.WEB (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

3/9/2010 11:33 AM

FAIR USE DEFENSE

279

sion” between the covers of Spy Notes and Cliffs Notes, Cliffs
Notes had met its burden to show an irreparable injury and a
likelihood of success on the merits.55 Therefore, the district
court enjoined Bantam from continuing to distribute Spy Notes
with the offending cover at issue.56
On appeal the Second Circuit Court vacated the district
court’s injunction because the:
[P]arody cover of Spy Notes, although it surely conjures up the original and goes to great lengths to use some of the identical colors and
aspects of the cover design of Cliffs Notes, raises only a slight risk of
consumer confusion that is outweighed by the public interest in free
expression, especially in a form of expression that must to some extent resemble the original.57

Before the ACPA became law in 1999, parodists had also
argued that their use of parodies could not subject them to liability because such use was noncommercial.58 In Planned Parenthood Federation of America v. Bucci, Plaintiff Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. (Planned Parenthood)
sued Defendant, Richard Bucci (Bucci) for alleged Lanham Act
violations. Planned Parenthood, a reproductive health care organization that operated a website at www.ppfa.org to educate
users about resources, sexual health, and abortion, sought an
injunction against Bucci.59 Bucci was the host of “Catholic Radio” and an anti-abortion activist who registered the
www.plannedparenthood.com domain name.60 Bucci created a
website at that domain name which contained anti-abortion
sentiments and links to communicate with an anti-abortion author.61 While Bucci admitted he wanted to attract Internet users who were looking for Planned Parenthood’s website,62 he

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 497 (emphasis added). At least one circuit court has noted that
certain domain names themselves may constitute protected speech. See
Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 586 (2d Cir. 2000)
(concluding that “while we hold that the existing gTLDs [generic top level domains] do not constitute protected speech under the First Amendment, we do
not preclude the possibility that certain domain names . . . could indeed
amount to protected speech.”).
58. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., v. Bucci, No. 97 Civ. 0629,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3338 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1997), aff’d, No. 97-7492, 1998
U.S. App. LEXIS 22179 (2d Cir. Feb. 9, 1998).
59. Id. at *1–2.
60. Id. at *3.
61. Id. at *3–5.
62. Id. at *1–2.
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argued that his actions fell outside the purview of the Lanham
Act because his actions constituted noncommercial speech.63
The District Court for the Southern District of New York disagreed, noting that:
[Bucci’s] use is commercial because of its effect on [Planned Parenthood’s] activities. First, [Bucci] has appropriated [Planned Parenthood’s] mark in order to reach an audience of Internet users who
want to reach [Planned Parenthood’s] services and viewpoint, intercepting them and misleading them in an attempt to offer his own political message. Second, [Bucci’s] appropriation not only provides Internet users with competing and directly opposing information, but
also prevents those users from reaching [Planned Parenthood] and its
services and message. In that way, [Bucci’s] use is classically competitive: he has taken [Planned Parenthood’s] mark as his own in order to
purvey his Internet services—his web site—to an audience intending
to access [Planned Parenthood’s] services.64

The district court also found that Bucci’s homepage using
Planned Parenthood’s mark as its address “convey[ed] the impression to Internet users that [Planned Parenthood] is the
sponsor of [Bucci’s] web site” and thus, issued an injunction
against him.65 In a concise, non-substantive opinion, the Second
Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment.66
IV. ANALYSIS OF CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS
REGARDING WHEN THE FAIR USE DEFENSE OF FREE
SPEECH OR PARODY CAN PRECLUDE LIABILITY UNDER
THE ACPA.
After the ACPA’s inception, accused cybersquatters began
to assert that their use of domain names and corresponding
websites in a parodic or commentary manner fell under the

63. Id. at *10.
64. Id. at *6.
65. Id. The district court also disagreed with Bucci’s reliance on Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296 (C.D. Cal. 1996), “for
the proposition that registering a domain name is not a commercial use within
the meaning of the anti-dilution provision of the Lanham Act.” Planned Parenthood, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *21. The district court observed that the
Panavision court noted that the “exception for noncommercial use of a famous
mark is intended to prevent courts from enjoining constitutionally-protected
speech.” Id. at *21 (quoting Panavision, 945 F. Supp. at 1303). However, the
district court stated that whether Bucci’s use of the mark was commercial
within the meaning of the Lanham Act was a distinct question from whether
Bucci’s use of the mark was protected by the First Amendment and that its
conclusion only decided the second question. Id. at *21–22.
66. Planned Parenthood, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 22179.
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ACPA’s fair use defense and safe harbor exceptions. The federal appellate courts were soon faced with cases involving claims
by alleged cybersquatters that their actions constituted a fair
use which precluded a finding of liability, forcing the courts to
begin articulating the standards for a successful fair use defense in dispute over domain names.67
A. FIRST CIRCUIT
In Northern Light Technology, Inc. v. Northern Lights
Club, Plaintiff, Northern Light Technology, sued Defendants,
Northern Lights Club, Jeff Burgar, and 641271 Alberta Ltd.,
for alleged ACPA violations.68 Plaintiff had registered “Northern Light” as a trademark in 1996 and owned and used the
domain name, www.northernlight.com.69 Defendant Jeff Burgar’s business included “register[ing] thousands of ‘catchy’ domain names—i.e., Internet addresses appropriating, in identical or slightly modified form, the names of popular people and
organizations.”70 Burgar was also the President of Defendant
Northern Lights Club, a member-less association whose mission was to “bring together devotees of the Northern Lights.”71
Defendants registered the www.northernlights.com domain
name
and
offered
email
accounts
(such
as
John.Doe@northernlights.com), although originally, users who
tried to locate the domain name on the Internet found no such
website.72 Several years later, Defendants established a substantive website at www.northernlights.com, featuring a sitesearch function with links to Northern Lights Community
members and to Plaintiff’s www.northernlight.com website.73

67. For brevity purposes, this Article references only the published decisions from the federal appellate courts where the court spent a significant portion of its opinion analyzing the fair use defense or the First Amendment in an
ACPA case.
68. N. Light Tech., Inc. v. N. Lights Club, 236 F.3d 57, 59–60 (1st Cir.
2001). Plaintiff originally sued Defendants for alleged violations of unfair
competition, trademark infringement, and trademark dilution. Id. at 59–60.
Plaintiff subsequently amended its complaint to include an ACPA claim but
dropped its federal and state trademark dilution claims and a state law claim
of unfair competition. Id. at 60.
69. Id. at 58.
70. Id. at 59.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. The court also noted that Plaintiff had not acquiesced to its website being listed on Defendants’ website. Id.
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The district court determined that Plaintiff was likely to
succeed on its ACPA claim because Plaintiff’s domain name
and Defendants’ domain name were confusingly similar and
there was evidence that Defendants had the requisite bad faith
intent to profit from their use of Plaintiff’s mark.74 Therefore,
the court issued a preliminary injunction, requiring Defendants
to post a disclaimer on its www.northernlights.com website.75
Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal, arguing in part
that (1) the district court had erred in determining that Plaintiff was likely to succeed on the merits of its claims; and (2) the
preliminary injunction violated their First Amendment rights
to free speech.76 Defendants denied that they had a bad faith
intent to profit, arguing that their conduct fell within the
ACPA’s “safe harbor” exception as they had “believed and had
reasonable grounds to believe that the use of the
[www.northernlights.com] domain name was a fair use or otherwise lawful.”77
The First Circuit disagreed, finding that Defendants’ “wellestablished pattern of registering multiple domain names containing famous trademarks, such as rollingstones.com, evinrude.com, and givenchy.com, has been made highly relevant
to the determination of bad faith.”78 Thus, it determined that
the district court properly found that Defendants had acted in
bad faith.79 Regarding Defendants’ First Amendment argument, the First Circuit declined to address that issue on appeal
because “[D]efendants only obliquely pressed their First
Amendment argument before the district court.”80 Therefore,
the First Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction against
Defendants.81

74. Id. at 61 (citing N. Light Tech., Inc. v. N. Lights Club, 97 F. Supp. 2d
96, 115–120 (D. Mass. 2000)).
75. Id. at 58.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 64 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii)).
78. Id. at 65.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 58. The court did not find that Defendants’ First Amendment
argument was waived on appeal; rather, it expressly stated that such argument could be made in the district court when a trial on the merits was held.
Id. at 66.
81. Id. at 58, 65.
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B. THIRD CIRCUIT
In Shields v. Zuccarini, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s award of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff
and trademark owner Joseph Shields (Shields) and against alleged cybersquatter, Defendant John Zuccarini (Zuccarini).82
Shields, a graphic artist who created cartoons using the name
“Joe Cartoon,” registered the www.joecartoon.com domain
name to operate a website selling his merchandise.83 Zuccarini
was a domain name wholesaler who registered the following
five domain names: www.joescartoon.com, www.joecarton.com,
www.joescartons.com,
www.joescartoons.com,
and
www.cartoonjoe.com.84 Originally, when an Internet user would
type in any of Zuccarini’s five domain names, advertisements
for other websites and credit card companies appeared.85 When
a user was in the website of these domain names, they could
exit only if they clicked on a series of advertisements.86 Zuccarini received money from advertisers for every click on these
websites.87
Shields sued Zuccarini for alleged ACPA and unfair competition violations.88 After Shields initiated his lawsuit, Zuccarini
changed the content of his websites to “political protest” pages
describing the litigation and criticizing www.joecartoon.com for
“depict[ing] the mutilation and killing of animals in a cartoon
format[.]”89 The district court issued a preliminary injunction in
Shields’ favor, ordered that Zuccarini’s five domain names be
transferred to Shields, and required Zuccarini “to refrain from

82. Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 488 (3d Cir. 2001).
83. Id. at 479.
84. Id. at 479–80.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 480.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 480. Zuccarini’s political protest pages included the following
statement:
joecartoon.com is a web site that depicts the mutilation and killing of
animals in a shockwave based cartoon format—many children are inticed [sic] to the web site, not knowing what is really there and then
encouraged to join in the mutilation and killing through use of the
shockwave cartoon presented to them. . . . As the owner of this domain name, I am being sued by joecartoon.com for $100,000 so he can
use this domain to direct more kids to a web site that not only desensitizes children to killing animals, but makes it seem like great fun
and games.
Id. (quoting Shields v. Zuccarini, 89 F. Supp. 2d 634, 635–36 (E.D. Pa. 2000)).
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‘using or abetting the use of’ the infringing domain names or
any other domain names substantially similar to Shields’
marks.”90
However, the district court denied Shields’ original motion
for summary judgment, finding a genuine issue of material fact
existed on the ACPA claim.91 Even though Zuccarini admitted
he registered variations of www.joecartoon.com because they
were confusingly similar, he also claimed “that his use of the
variations was fair and lawful, and that he is using the domain
names ‘for the purpose of exercising his First Amendment
rights of protest against the Plaintiff’s domain which has objectionable and offensive materials.’”92 Shields subsequently filed
a second motion for summary judgment, which the district
court granted after finding that “Zuccarini had registered five
variations of Shields’ name willfully, in bad faith, and in violation of the [ACPA].”93
On appeal, the Third Circuit noted that Shields needed to
prove the following to prevail on his ACPA claim: (1) “Joe Cartoon” is a distinctive or famous mark entitled to protection;94 (2)
Zuccarini’s domain names are identical or confusingly similar
to Shields’ mark; and (3) Zuccarini registered the domain
names with the bad faith intent to profit from them.95 The
Third Circuit determined that Shields’ trademark, and his
www.joecartoon.com domain name, were worthy of ACPA protection.96 It also found that Zuccarini’s five domain names
were confusingly similar to www.joecartoon.com97 because Zuccarini purposely intended “to register a domain name in anticipation that consumers would make a mistake [in the spelling of
the domain name], thereby increasing the number of hits his
site would receive, and consequently, the number of advertising
dollars he would gain.”98
90. Id. at 481.
91. Id. at 480.
92. Id. at 480 n.2.
93. Id. at 481.
94. The court determined that Shields’ “Cartoon Joe” mark was distinctive and his www.joecartoon.com website was famous. Id. at 482–83.
95. Id. at 482; see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A) (2006); cf. Sporty’s Farm
L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Mkt. Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 497–99 (2d Cir. 2000).
96. Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 2001).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 484. The court also found that Zuccarini’s five domain names
were “confusingly similar” because of the strong similarities between these
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As to the issue of whether Zuccarini acted with a bad faith
intent to profit, the Third Circuit determined that Zuccarini’s
actions did not constitute a noncommercial or fair use because
he registered these domain names to divert customers from visiting Shield’s website and to harm “the goodwill associated
with [Shields’] . . . mark.”99
Zuccarini unsuccessfully tried to invoke the protection of
the ACPA’s safe harbor provision by asserting his First
Amendment rights justified his “protest pages.”100 The Third
Circuit disagreed, finding that Zuccarini’s actions were a “spurious explanation cooked up purely for this suit.”101 The Court
also noted that when Zuccarini originally registered his five
domain names, he had used them for commercial purposes; he
did not change them into “protest pages” until the lawsuit had
been filed.102 Thus, the Third Circuit affirmed the district
court’s summary judgment award against Zuccarini.103
C. FOURTH CIRCUIT
In Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.,
Plaintiff Virtual Works, Inc. (Virtual Works) registered the
domain name, www.vw.net, used it in connection with a business for two years, and then sought to sell it to the highest bidder.104 Defendant Volkswagen of America (VW) became aware
of Virtual Works’ intentions to sell www.vw.net and tried to
unsuccessfully enforce a dispute resolution process through
Network Solutions.105 Virtual Works filed an action for declarafive domain names and www.joecartoon.com based upon the “likely misspellings of famous marks or personal names.” Id. at 483.
99. Id. at 485; see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i) (2006).
100. Shields, 254 F.3d at 485. The safe harbor provision of §
1125(d)(1)(B)(ii) states that “bad faith intent . . . shall not be found in any case
in which the court determines that the person believed and had reasonable
grounds to believe that the use of the domain name was a fair use or otherwise
lawful.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2006).
101. Shields, 254 F.3d at 485 (quoting Shields v. Zuccarini, 89 F. Supp. 2d
634, 640 (E.D. Pa. 2000)).
102. Id. at 485–86 (3d Cir. 2001). The court was not aware of any “authority providing that a defendant’s ‘fair use’ of a distinctive or famous mark only
after the filing of a complaint alleging infringement can absolve that defendant of liability for his earlier unlawful activities.” Id. at 486.
103. Id. at 479.
104. Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 238 F.3d 264, 266–67
(4th Cir. 2001).
105. Id. Network Solutions was the “company authorized by the government [at that time] to serve as a registrar for Internet domain names.” Id.

LAMPKE LF CHECK.WEB (DO NOT DELETE)

286

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

3/9/2010 11:33 AM

[Vol. 11:1

tory judgment against VW, and VW counterclaimed, accusing
Virtual Works of cybersquatting, trademark dilution, and inBecause Virtual Works had registered
fringement.106
www.vw.net in 1996, before Congress enacted the ACPA, VW’s
only available remedy for Virtual Works’ alleged ACPA violation was “to have the [www.vw.net] domain name transferred
to the owner of the mark or canceled.”107
VW moved for summary judgment on all of its counterclaims, which the district court granted after finding that “Virtual Works had a bad faith intent to profit from the vw.net domain name and that its use of vw.net diluted and infringed
upon the VW mark.”108 The district court also ordered Virtual
Works to give VW the rights to vw.net.109
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit agreed that the district
court’s finding of bad faith intent to profit by Virtual Works
was supported by the evidence. Circumstantial evidence included: “1) the famousness of the VW mark; 2) the similarity of
vw.net to the VW mark; 3) the admission that Virtual Works
never once did business as VW nor identified itself as such; and
4) the availability of vwi.org and vwi.net at the time Virtual
Works registered vw.net.”110 The direct evidence consisted of: 1)
statements made by two Virtual Works executives regarding
selling vw.net to Volkswagen in the future; and 2) Virtual
Work’s offer to Volkswagen that “vw.net would be sold to the
highest bidder if Volkswagen did not make an offer within
twenty-four hours.”111
The Fourth Circuit also determined that VW’s mark was
famous, that Virtual Works had registered, trafficked in, and
used vw.net, and that vw.net was confusingly similar to the

106. Id. at 267.
107. Id. at 268; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2006).
108. Virtual Works, 238 F.3d at 267 (citing Virtual Works, Inc. v. Network
Solutions, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 845 (E.D. Va. 2000)). The Fourth Circuit noted
that two Virtual Works executives had “talked about Volkswagen and decided
that [they] would use the domain name for [the] company, but if Volkswagen
offered to work out a deal for services or products, that [they] would sell it to
[Volkswagen] for a lot of money.” Id. at 266.
109. Id. at 269.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 269–70. However, the Fourth Circuit did observe that “domain
names that are abbreviations of a company’s formal name are quite common.
To view the use of such names as tantamount to bad faith would chill Internet
entrepreneurship with the prospect of endless litigation.” Id. at 269.
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famous VW mark.112 Nor could Virtual Works cloak itself with
the ACPA’s safe harbor provision because Virtual Works confessed its “hope of profiting from consumer confusion of vw.net
with the VW mark.”113 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the district court’s finding that Virtual Works violated the
ACPA.114
A few months later, the Fourth Circuit rendered its decision in People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, Plaintiff, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals
(PETA), an animal rights organization with the website
www.peta.com, sued Defendant, Michael Doughney (Doughney), for cybersquatting.115 Doughney registered the
www.peta.org domain name and created a website at that domain name titled “People Eating Tasty Animals.”116 The
www.peta.org website contained (1) a “People Eating Tasty Animals” caption; (2) references that the site was for those who
enjoyed hunting, eating meat, and wearing fur and leather; (3)
links to anti-PETA organizations; and (4) an opportunity to “exit immediately” which led users to PETA’s official
www.peta.com website.117
Doughney argued that his website was a constitutionally
protected parody of PETA, that he did not act in bad faith with
an intent to profit, and that he believed his use of PETA’s mark
was lawful.118 The district court disagreed, explaining that:
[O]nly after arriving at . . . [the www.peta.org] web site could the web
site browser determine that this was not a web site owned, controlled
112. Id. at 270–71; cf. Shade’s Landing, Inc. v. Williams, 76 F. Supp. 2d
983, 990 (D. Minn. 1999) (“Because all domain names include one of these extensions, the distinctions between a domain name ending with ‘.com’ and the
same name ending with ‘.net’ is not highly significant.”).
113. Virtual Works, 238 F.3d at 270; see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2006).
114. Virtual Works, 238 F.3d at 266. The court did not address Volkswagen’s claims of trademark infringement or dilution since “Virtual Works’ violation of the ACPA supports the remedy Volkswagen seeks [namely, the rights
to vw.net].” Id.
115. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d
359, 362 (4th Cir. 2001).
116. Id. at 362–363. PETA also sought injunctive relief and sued Doughney
for service mark infringement, unfair competition, and dilution. Id. at 363.
117. Id. Doughney eventually moved his website to www.mtd.com/tasty
where he added a disclaimer indicating there was no affiliation with PETA. Id.
118. Id. at 369. The ACPA’s safe harbor provision states that bad faith intent “shall not be found in any case in which the court determines that the
person believed and had reasonable grounds to believe that the use of the domain name was fair use or otherwise lawful.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii)
(2006).

LAMPKE LF CHECK.WEB (DO NOT DELETE)

288

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

3/9/2010 11:33 AM

[Vol. 11:1

or sponsored by PETA. Therefore, the two images: (1) the famous
PETA name and (2) the ‘People Eating Tasty Animals’ website was
not a parody because [they were not] simultaneous.119

The district court also determined that Doughney’s use of
PETA’s mark was commercial and thus, his use of PETA’s
mark was neither noncommercial nor fair and further, that
Doughney did not have reasonable grounds to believe that his
use of PETA’s mark was lawful, and thus, it granted summary
judgment in favor of PETA.120
On appeal, Doughney did not dispute that his
www.peta.org domain name could cause a “likelihood of confusion between his web site and PETA;” rather, he asked that the
Fourth Circuit “consider his website in conjunction with the
domain name because, together, they purportedly parody PETA
and, thus, do not cause a likelihood of confusion.”121 The Fourth
Circuit articulated its four-part test for a successful parody: (1)
the site must convey two simultaneous and contradictory messages; (2) that it is the original; (3) that it is not the original but
is a parody instead; and (4) it diminishes the risk of consumer
confusion “by conveying just enough of the original design to
allow the consumer to appreciate the point of parody.”122
The Fourth Circuit found that Doughney’s domain name
conveyed the first message but that “the second message [was]
conveyed only when the viewer read[] the content of the website.”123 The Fourth Circuit also noted the district court’s finding that “an internet user would not realize that they were not
on an official PETA web site until after they had used PETA’s

119. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 263 F.3d . at 364 (quoting
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Doughney, 113 F. Supp.
2d 915, 921 (E.D. Va. 2000)).
120. Id. at 362, 369.
121. Id. at 366. The Fourth Circuit’s analysis of PETA’s trademark infringement claim centered on whether the “unauthorized use of a trademark
infringes the trademark holder’s rights if it is likely to confuse an ‘ordinary
consumer’ as to the source or sponsorship of the goods.” Id. (citing AnheuserBusch, Inc. v. L. & L. Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 318 (4th Cir. 1992)).
122. Id. (quoting Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482,
1486 (10th Cir. 1987)).
123. Id. While Doughney argued that his website content delivered the
second required message needed to successfully argue a parody, the Fourth
Circuit disagreed, implying that it is the domain name (and not the website
content) which must convey the first and second simultaneous, yet contradictory, messages. Id. at 366–67.
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mark to access the web page ‘www.peta.org.’”124 Therefore,
Doughney’s use of www.peta.org was not a constitutionallyprotected parody, and his domain name caused a likelihood of
confusion.125 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed summary
judgment in PETA’s favor on its ACPA claim.126
Four years later, the Fourth Circuit decided Lamparello v.
Falwell. In Lamparello v. Falwell, alleged cybersquatter Christopher
Lamparello
(Lamparello)
registered
the
www.fallwell.com domain name,127 an intentional misspelling
of the name of Reverend Jerry Falwell (Falwell), a nationally
recognized minister who maintained a website at
www.falwell.com.128 Lamparello’s www.fallwell.com website
contained his responses to Falwell’s views about gay people and
homosexuality that offended Lamparello.129 Although Lamparello’s website stated that “[t]his website is NOT affiliated with
Jerry Falwell or his ministry,” it did contain a link to Reverend
Falwell’s www.falwell.com website.130
Lamparello subsequently filed suit against Falwell, seeking a declaratory judgment of noninfringement.131 Defendant
Falwell counterclaimed against Lamparello, asserting various

124. Id. (quoting Doughney, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 921).
125. The Fourth Circuit also found that Doughney’s domain name itself did
not indicate it was a parody but rather, copied PETA’s protected mark. Id. at
366 (quoting Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, Inc.,
886 F.2d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1989) (emphasis in original)).
126. Id. at 367; see also Morrison & Foerster LLP v. Wick, 94 F. Supp. 2d
1125, 1134–35 (D. Colo. 2000) (contending that defendant’s use of plaintiffs’
mark in domain name “does not convey two simultaneous and contradictory
messages” because “[o]nly by reading through the content of the sites could the
user discover that the domain names are an attempt at parody”); Planned Parenthood Federation of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 97 Civ. 0629, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3338, at *33 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1997) aff’d, No. 97-7492, 1998 U.S. App.
LEXIS 22179 (2d Cir. Feb. 9, 1998) (rejecting the parody defense because
“[s]eeing or typing the ‘planned parenthood’ mark and accessing the web site
are two separate and nonsimultaneous activities”). In analyzing PETA’s ACPA
claim, the Fourth Circuit observed that it was “undisputed that Doughney
made statements to the press and on his website recommending that PETA
attempt to ‘make him an offer’ to settle the claim.” People for the Ethical
Treatment of Animals, 263 F.3d at 368.
127. Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 311 (4th Cir. 2005). Reverend
Falwell held the common law trademarks of “Jerry Falwell” and “Falwell” and
the registered trademark of “Listen America with Jerry Falwell.” Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 312
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causes of action, including cybersquatting.132 The district court
considered cross-motions for summary judgment and granted
summary judgment in Falwell’s favor.133 Lamparello was also
required to “transfer the domain name [www.fallwell.com] to
Reverend Falwell.”134
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit noted that in order for Falwell to prevail on his ACPA claim, he had to demonstrate that
Lamparello: (1) had a bad faith intent to profit from using
www.fallwell.com; and (2) that www.fallwell.com “is identical
or confusingly similar to, or dilutive of, the distinctive and famous [Falwell] mark.”135 In its analysis of whether Lamparello
acted in bad faith, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Lamparello’s use of www.fallwell.com was permissible and fair because
he had only used it to comment on and “criticize Reverend Falwell’s views.”136 The court commented that “[t]he use of a domain name to engage in criticism or commentary ‘even where
done for profit’ does not alone evidence a bad faith intent to
profit.”137 After all, the “ACPA was enacted to eradicate . . . the
practice of cybersquatters registering several hundred domain
names in an effort to sell them to the legitimate owners of the
mark,” not to “impinge the First Amendment rights of critics

132. Id.
133. Lamparello v. Falwell, 360 F. Supp. 2d 768, 775 (E.D. Va. 2004).
134. Lamparello, 420 F.3d at 312. However, the district court “denied Reverend Falwell’s request for statutory damages or attorney fees, reasoning
that the ‘primary motive’ of Lamparello’s website was ‘to put forth opinions on
issues that were contrary to those of [Reverend Falwell]’ and ‘not to take away
monies or to profit.’” Id. (quoting Falwell, 360 F. Supp. 2d 768 at 775).
135. Id. at 318 (quoting People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v.
Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 367 (4th Cir. 2001)). The parties agreed that Lamparello’s website did not have a “measurable impact on the quantity of visits to
[Reverend Falwell’s] web site at www.falwell.com.” Id. at 311.
136. Id. at 320–321 (citing People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 263
F.3d at 367). The court analyzed Lamparello’s criticism of Reverend Falwell in
his www.fallwell.com website under the “bona fide noncommercial or fair use”
exception of the ACPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IV). Id. at 320 (citing H.R.
REP. NO. 106-412, at 11(1999)).
137. The court emphasized that “Lamparello did not . . . stand to gain financially from sales of [a book Lamparello favored and whose link he posted
on his website].” Id. at 320. Applying the remaining eight factors of 15 U.S.C. §
1125(d)(1)(B), the court also determined that Lamparello’s domain name was
not likely to create a likelihood of confusion as to its source or affiliation, that
Lamparello had not made an effort to sell the domain name to Reverend Falwell for financial gain, and that he had not registered multiple domain names.
Id. at 321.
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and commentators.”138 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit reversed
the district court’s award of summary judgment in favor of Reverend Falwell and entered summary judgment in favor of
Lamparello in the declaratory action.139 In doing so, the Fourth
Circuit joined the Fifth140 and Sixth Circuits141 in holding that
“the use of a mark in a domain name for a gripe site criticizing
the markholder does not constitute cybersquatting.”142
D. FIFTH CIRCUIT
In E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs Ltd., Plaintiffs, the
Ernest and Julio Gallo Winery (“Gallo”) had held a registered
trademark in “Ernest and Julio Gallo” since 1964.143 Gallo sued
Defendants Spider Webs Ltd. and its three principals (collectively “Defendants”) for violating the ACPA after Defendants
registered the domain name, www.ernestandjuliogallo.com.144
Defendants’ business ventures included developing thousands
of internet addresses by registering them with Network Solutions, Inc. and then selling some of those domain names on
eBay for $10,000 or more.145 After the lawsuit was initiated,
Defendants’ website at www.ernestandjuliogallo.com began to
contain statements about the lawsuit, about alcohol use, corporate misrepresentations, and references to a “Whiney Wine-

138. Id. at 313. The Fourth Circuit also noted that “[t]he legislature believed [the fair use provision of the ACPA was necessary] to ‘protect[] the
rights of Internet users and the interests of all Americans in free speech and
protected uses of trademarked names for such things as parody, comment,
criticism, comparative advertising, news reporting, etc.’” Id. at 314 (quoting S.
REP. NO. 106–140, at 8 (1999)).
139. Id. at 322.
140. See infra pp. 27–29; see also TMI, Inc. v. Maxwell, 368 F.3d 433, 439
(5th Cir. 2004) (noting that Maxwell’s domain name at www.trendmaker.com
was noncommercial because it was designed only “to inform potential customers about a negative experience with the company,” and thus, it did not violate
the ACPA).
141. See infra pp. 30–32; see also Lucas Nursery & Landscaping, Inc. v.
Grosse, 359 F.3d 806, 809 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that Grosse’s domain name
of www.lucasnursery.com which informed “fellow consumers of one’s experience with a particular service provider” did not violate the ACPA).
142. Lamparello, 420 F.3d at 321–22 (analyzing Maxwell, 368 F.3d 433 and
Lucas Nursery, 359 F.3d 806).
143. E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs Ltd., 286 F.3d 270, 272 (5th Cir.
2002).
144. Id. at 271. Gallo also accused Defendants of trademark infringement,
unfair competition, and dilution. Id. at 272.
145. Id. at 272.

LAMPKE LF CHECK.WEB (DO NOT DELETE)

292

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

3/9/2010 11:33 AM

[Vol. 11:1

ry.”146 The first page of the www.ernestandjuliogallo.com website contained a disclaimer, stating that it was not part of the
Ernest and Julio Gallo Wineries.147
While Gallo did not challenge Defendant’s criticisms, it did
challenge Defendants’ actions which they argued “sought to associate the Gallo trademark with the contents of its web site
and because [Defendants] prevented Gallo from using its mark
to identify its goods and services on the internet.”148 The district court concluded that Defendants registered their domain
name in bad faith and that their use was not a fair use.149 The
district court then granted summary judgment to Gallo on the
ACPA claim and ordered the www.ernestandjuliogallo.com domain name transferred to Gallo.150
In an appeal to the Fifth Circuit, Defendants challenged
the district court’s finding that they had acted with a bad faith
intent to profit.151 In its bad faith analysis, the Fifth Circuit
found that Defendants’ use of www.ernestandjuliogallo.com
was commercial and not a fair use as Defendants had testified
at a deposition that they hoped Gallo “would contact them regarding the domain name.”152 The Fifth Circuit noted that Defendants’ website had changed after the lawsuit was filed. Following the previous decision of the Third Circuit,153 the Fifth
Circuit held that “when a registrant first uses a web site after
litigation begins, this undermines any claim that the [Defendants’] use was in good faith or was a fair use under the
ACPA.”154 The Fifth Circuit subsequently concluded that “[Defendants] knew Gallo had a famous mark in which Gallo had
built up goodwill, and that they hoped to profit from this by registering ‘ernestandjuliogallo.com’ and waiting for Gallo to con-

146. Id.
147. Id. at 272–73.
148. Id. at 279.
149. Id. at 272.
150. Id. at 278.
151. Id. at 274. Defendants did not appeal the district court’s findings that
“Gallo had a valid registration in its mark, that the mark is famous and distinctive, and that the domain name registered by Spider Webs is identical or
confusingly similar to Gallo’s mark.” Id.
152. Id. at 275.
153. Id. at 276; see Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 485–86 (3d Cir.
2001).
154. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 286 F.3d at 276.
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tact them . . . .”155 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court’s determination that Defendants had acted with a
bad faith intent to profit and affirmed summary judgment in
favor of Gallo.156
Two years later, the Fifth Circuit issued its decision in
TMI Inc. v. Maxwell. Plaintiff TMI, Inc. (TMI), a company that
constructed homes under the name TrendMaker Homes, sued
Defendant Joseph Maxwell (“Maxwell”) for violating the
ACPA.157 Maxwell was unsatisfied with a TMI representative
about a model house and he created a website at
www.trendmakerhome.com, which closely resembled TMI’s
www.trendmakerhomes.com website.158 Maxwell’s website contained his complaints and displeasures about his interactions
with TMI but informed viewers the website was not a TMIsponsored site.159 Maxwell’s website also included a “Treasure
Chest” feature which allowed viewers to get information about
another contractor who had performed construction work for
Maxwell.160 Maxwell eventually removed the site and let the
www.trendmakerhome.com registration expire.161 TMI subsequently acquired the www.trendmakerhome.com domain
After
Maxwell
failed
to
re-acquire
the
name.162
www.trendmakerhome.com domain name, he registered the
www.trendmakerhome.info domain name but never posted any
content on a website at that domain.163
After trial the district court held that the ACPA requires a
mark to have a commercial use for an alleged cybersquatter to
be liable under the ACPA.164 Finding that Maxwell’s use of
www.trendmakerhome.com was the “kind of commercial use
155. Id. at 277. The district court determined that “because internet domain names cannot contain ampersands or spaces, and because all internet
domain names must end in a top-level domain such as ‘.co,’ ‘.org.,’ ‘.net,’ etc.,
‘ernestandjuliogallo.com’ is effectively the same thing as ‘Ernest & Julio Gallo.’” Id. at 276.
156. Id. at 277.
157. TMI Inc. v. Maxwell, 368 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2004). TMI further alleged
that Maxwell’s website violated the anti-dilution provision of the Lanham Act.
Id. at 434 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) and the Texas Anti-Dilution Statute,
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 16.29)).
158. Id. at 434.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 434–35.
161. Id. at 434.
162. Id. at 435.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 436.
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prohibited by the ACPA,” it determined that Maxwell had violated the ACPA and enjoined him “from using names, marks,
and domain names similar to . . . TMI’s marks, including Trend
Maker.”165 The court ordered Maxwell to transfer
www.trendmakerhome.info to TMI.166
Maxwell appealed, and the Fifth Circuit determined that
the ACPA “does not contain . . . a specific commercial-use requirement”167 but rather, has nine factors to determine whether a “bad faith intent to profit” existed.168 The Fifth Circuit ultimately held that Maxwell’s use of TMI’s mark was
noncommercial because: (1) Maxwell never accepted payment
for any postings on the Treasure Chest feature; (2) Maxwell did
not charge for viewing the Treasure Chest feature; (3) Maxwell
never intended to charge money for viewers using his website;
(4) Maxwell’s website did not contain any advertising or links
to other websites; (5) Maxwell was not engaged in the business
of selling domain names; and (6) there was no evidence that
Maxwell’s use had any business purpose.169
In analyzing whether Maxwell had a bad faith intent to
profit, the Fifth Circuit stated that “[m]uch of the district
court’s analysis of bad faith intent to profit focuse[d] on Maxwell’s behavior during the settlement negotiations and . . . his

165. Id. at 435, 438.
166. The district court also found that Maxwell had violated the antidilution provision of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)) and the Texas AntiDilution Statute (TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 16.29). Id. at 435. While the
district court issued an order requiring TMI to submit a proposed judgment
entry and supposedly giving Maxwell ten days to respond to TMI’s proposed
judgment entry, it eventually signed TMI’s proposed judgment entry without
allowing Maxwell ten days to respond. Id. at 434–35. Furthermore, the signed
judgment entry provided a much broader injunction than the district court’s
order. Id. at 435. While the Fifth Circuit analyzed the depth of this broader
injunction, such analysis is not pertinent to this Article.
167. Id. at 436.
168. Id. (citing 15 USC § 1125(d)(IV)).
169. Id. at 437–38; cf. E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs Ltd., 286 F.3d
270, 275–76 (5th Cir. 2002) (concluding that where Defendant registered domain names like www.www.ernestandjuliogallo.com and subsequently tried to
auction off the names while refusing bids under $10,000, Defendant’s use was
clearly commercial and thus, the court “did not need to decide whether the
ACPA also requires use in commerce”); Lucas Nursery & Landscaping, Inc. v.
Grosse, 359 F.3d 806, 809 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that it need not consider
arguments about whether the ACPA covers noncommercial use, “as the statute directs a reviewing court to consider only a defendant’s ‘bad faith intent
to profit’ from the use of a mark held by another party”).
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backing out of [a] settlement.”170 The Fifth Circuit also noted
that “the Sixth Circuit recently affirmed a trial court’s finding
that a disgruntled customer who posted a website similar to
Maxwell’s did not have a bad faith intent to profit,”171 and explained that:
Maxwell made bona fide noncommercial use of the mark in his site,
and . . . TMI made no showing that Maxwell intended to divert customers from its own site. . . . Maxwell never offered to sell the domain
name, and certainly never had a pattern of selling domain names to
mark owners. Maxwell did not behave improperly when providing
contact information [when registering his domain name]. . . . Maxwell
registered the second domain name [of www.trendmakerhome.info]
for the same purposes as the first one and only after his registration
of the first name [www.trendmakerhome.com] expired.172

Therefore, the Fifth Circuit followed the Sixth Circuit’s rationale in Lucas Nursery & Landscaping, Inc. v. Grosse, and
held that “Maxwell’s conduct is not the kind of harm that [the]
ACPA was designed to prevent.”173 Thus, it reversed the judgment of the district court and entered judgment in favor of
Maxwell.174
E. SIXTH CIRCUIT
In Lucas Nursery & Landscaping, Inc. v. Grosse,175 Plain170. TMI, 368 F.3d at 439. The Fifth Circuit criticized the district court for
not explaining in its Memorandum and Order how the nine bad faith factors
applied to the facts of the case. Id.
171. Id. at 439 (citing Lucas Nursery & Landscaping, Inc. v. Grosse, 359
F.3d 806, 811 (6th Cir. 2004)); see infra pp. 30–32. The court also emphasized
that “. . . as in Lucas Nursery, the site’s purpose as a method to inform potential customers about a negative experience with the company is key.” Id.
172. Id. at 440 (discussing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(IV)–(VIII)).
173. Id. The court also concluded that the district court erred when it found
that Maxwell’s actions violated the Texas Anti-Dilution Statute (TEX. BUS. &
COM. CODE § 16.29) because the statute was “not intended to address nontrademark uses of a name to comment on, criticize, ridicule, parody, or disparage the goods or business of the name’s owner.” Id. (quoting Express One
Int’l, Inc. v. Steinbeck, 53 S.W.3d 895, 899 (Tex. App. 2001)).
174. Id.
175. Lucas Nursery & Landscaping, Inc. v. Grosse, 359 F.3d 806 (6th Cir.
2004). Prior to Lucas Nursery, the Sixth Circuit had rendered an ACPA decision in 2002 in Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (6th Cir. 2002). However, this
case was essentially decided on procedural grounds and is not substantially
related to the arguments made in this Article. In Bird, Plaintiff Darrell Bird
(Bird) sued several alleged cybersquatters for cybersquatting, trademark infringement, unfair competition, and trademark dilution. Bird owned a business named Financia, Inc. as well as the www.financia.com domain name. Defendants had registered the tradename “Financia” with the United States
Patent & Trademark Office and also registered www.efinancia.com as a do-
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tiff Lucas Nursery and Landscaping, Inc. (Lucas Nursery) sued
a former customer, Defendant Michelle Grosse (Grosse), who
was displeased with Lucas Nursery’s landscaping services, for
violating the ACPA.176 Grosse had registered the domain name,
www.lucasnursery.com, and created a website titled “My Lucas
Landscaping Experience” at that domain to complain about the
Lucas Nursery services she received.177 Both parties filed crossmotions for summary judgment, and the district court subsequently granted summary judgment in Grosse’s favor.178
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit conducted a de novo review of
whether Grosse had acted with a “bad faith intent to profit” as
required by the ACPA.179 It found that the following “bad faith”
factors weighed against Grosse: (1) she did “not hold a trademark or other intellectual property rights to the domain name
or names included in the registered domain name;” (2) “[t]he
domain name neither consists of her legal name or any name
used to refer to her[;]” and (3) “Grosse has also not used the
domain name in connection with any offering of goods or services.”180 As to the bad faith fourth factor regarding “fair use,”
the Court found that Grosse’s website was “used for noncommercial purposes.”181
main name. Defendants parked the www.efinancia.com domain name on the
website of an Internet domain names registrar. Id. at 869–70. The
www.efinancia.com domain name was later listed on an auction website as being available for purchase and Defendants also attempted separately to sell
the domain name. Bird argued that Defendants had a bad faith intent to profit
by registering the www.efinancia.com domain name. Defendants successfully
filed dispositive motions pursuant to Fed. Civ. R. 12(B)(2) and (6). Id. at 870,
876. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit found that only one defendant had registered
the www.efinancia.com domain name and held that “liability for using a domain name can only exist for the registrant or that person’s authorized licensee.” Id. at 881. The Sixth Circuit also found that 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)
precluded liability under the ACPA and affirmed the district court’s judgment
in Defendants’ favor. Id. at 877–79, 881–82.
176. Lucas Nursery, 359 F.3d at 807.
177. Id. at 807–08. After learning of Grosse’s website, Lucas Nursery eventually sent Grosse a cease and desist letter, prompting Grosse to contact the
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office and discover that Lucas Nursery was not a
registered trademark. Id. at 808.
178. Id.
179. Id. With respect to the nine bad faith factors, the court stated that “it
is not clear to this Court that the presence of simply one factor that indicates a
bad faith intent to profit, without more, can satisfy an imposition of liability
within the meaning of the ACPA.” Id. at 810.
180. Id. at 809.
181. Id.
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The fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth “bad faith” factors also
weighed in Grosse’s favor.182 Since Lucas Nursery did not have
a website, Grosse could not have intended to divert consumers
from Lucas Nursery’s website or mislead users as to the website’s sponsor.183 To the contrary, Grosse’s website stated that
Grosse had created it for the sole purpose of describing her
prior dealings with Lucas Nursery.184 Grosse also never bought
or registered additional domain names, never tried to sell the
domain name to Lucas Nursery, nor did she provide false contact information when she registered the domain name.185 The
Sixth Circuit further found that it was never Grosse’s intention
to register hundreds of domain names in the hopes of selling
them to trademark owners.186 Rather, it found that “Grosse’s
actions . . . seem to have been undertaken in the spirit of informing fellow consumers about the practices of a landscaping
company that she believed had performed inferior work on her
yard[,]” a purpose consistent with the ACPA’s consumer protection aim.187 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of Grosse.188
Seven months later, the Sixth Circuit decided DaimlerChrysler v. The Net, Inc., Plaintiff DaimlerChrysler sued Defendant The Net Inc. (“the Net”) for ACPA violations after the
Net registered the www.foradodge.com domain name, and
created a pornographic website at that domain.189 Decades earlier, DaimlerChrysler had registered the DODGE mark as a
trademark, and it later established a www.4ADODGE.com

182. Id. at 809–10.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 811.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 809–11. Lucas Nursery argued that the decision in People for the
Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney supported a finding that Grosse
had violated the ACPA. Id. at 810 (citing People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001)). The Sixth Circuit disagreed, noting that in People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, the alleged
cybersquatter had registered the www.peta.org domain name and created a
website at that domain name in which he urged PETA to make him an offer
for the www.peta.org domain name. The alleged cybersquatter in PETA had
also “registered other domain names that [were] identical or similar to the
marks or names of other famous people and organizations.” Id. The Sixth Circuit found that Grosse had not “engaged in . . . such offensive conduct.” Id.
189. DaimlerChrysler v. The Net, Inc., 388 F.3d 201, 203 (6th Cir. 2004).
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website to advertise and market its products.190 The district
court entered summary judgment for DaimlerChrysler and
permanently enjoined the defendants from using the “foradodge” name.191
On appeal, the Net argued that the district court erred because: (1) the mark “4ADODGE” was not a protected trademark for purposes of the ACPA; (2) it did not have a bad faith
intent to profit when the www.foradodge.com domain name was
registered; and (3) its actions were protected by the ACPA’s
safe harbor exception.192 In its analysis of whether “4ADODGE”
was a protected mark, the Sixth Circuit noted that a trademark
need not be formally registered in order to be protected under
the ACPA.193 Although the “4ADODGE” mark was not registered, DaimlerChrysler had registered its DODGE mark in
1939 and continuously used it thereafter.194 However, the mark
“ha[d] been used by the plaintiff to distinguish its automobiles
for a number of years [and as] early as 1994, [p]laintiff advertised and used as a toll free telephone number 1-800-4-ADaimlerChrysler
had
also
used
its
DODGE.”195
www.4ADODGE.COM website since 1995.196
The Sixth Circuit also noted that “[e]ven if there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether [DaimlerChrysler]
has a valid trademark in 4ADODGE, the district court also
concluded that the [Net’s] ‘foradodge.com’ domain name was
confusingly similar to [DaimlerChrysler’s] distinctive and famous DODGE mark.”197 The court observed that “[c]ourts generally have held that a domain name that incorporates a trademark is ‘confusingly similar to’ that mark if ‘consumers might
think that [the domain name] is used, approved, or permitted’
by the mark holder.”198 Moreover, it noted that “slight differ190. Id. at 203, 205.
191. Id. at 203.
192. Id. at 203–04. Since the first time the Net asserted that they “had reasonable grounds to believe that the use of the domain name was a fair use or
otherwise lawful” was during the appeal, the Sixth Circuit considered this argument waived. Id. at 204–05, n.1 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii)).
193. Id. at 205; see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205,
209 (2000); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992).
194. DaimlerChrysler, 388 F.3d at 205.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. (alteration in original) (citing Ford Motor Co., v. Greatdo-
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ences between domain names and registered marks, such as
the addition of minor or generic words to the disputed domain
names are irrelevant.”199
As to whether the Net had a bad faith intent to profit when
it registered the www.foradodge.com domain name, the Sixth
Circuit determined that eight of the nine factors, 200 weighed in
favor of a finding of bad faith.201 After all, the Net had registered dozens of other domain names that were similar to other
trademarks, such as www.themicrosoftnetwork.com.202 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary
judgment in DaimlerChrysler’s favor.203
The Audi AG v. D’Amato, case soon followed. Plaintiff, Audi AG (Audi), sued Defendant, Bob D’Amato (D’Amato), for
ACPA violations, trademark infringement, and dilution after
D’Amato registered the www.audisport.com domain name to
sell Audi goods and merchandise containing Audi’s “AUDI” and
“AUDI FOUR RING LOGO” trademarks.204 D’Amato described
and displayed Audi’s trademarks on his website after allegedly
receiving verbal permission from an Audi employee.205 The
www.audisport.com website’s homepage also contained statements indicating that the website was Audi’s “cooperative” and
its content contained hyperlinks to www.audisportline.com.206

mains.Com, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 635, 641 (E.D. Mich. 2001)). The Sixth Circuit also noted that the Net did not appeal the district court’s finding that the
“‘foradodge.com’ domain name is confusingly similar to [DaimlerChrysler’s]
protected DODGE mark.” Id. at 206.
199. Id. (citing Ford Motor Co., 177 F. Supp. 2d at 641) (internal quotations
omitted) (holding that marks incorporated into the domain names
“4fordparts.com,” “jaguarcenter.com,” and “volvoguy.com” were confusingly
similar to the marks FORD, JAGUAR, and VOLVO); see also Spear, Leeds, &
Kellogg v. Rosado, 122 F. Supp. 2d 403, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that domain names that combined the “Redi” mark with generic or descriptive terms
were confusingly similar to the plaintiff’s trademark).
200. The sixth bad faith factor under the ACPA, which the court found did
not weigh in favor of a finding of bad faith, contemplates whether a person’s
offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain name to the mark owner
or any third party for financial gain without having used, or having an intent
to use, the domain name in the bona fide offering of any goods or services, or
the person’s prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct. 15 U.S.C. §
1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VI) (2006).
201. DaimlerChrysler, 388 F.3d at 205.
202. Id. at 204, 206 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)).
203. Id. at 207.
204. Audi AG v. D’Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 538 (6th Cir. 2006).
205. Id. at 539.
206. Id. at 540.
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Consumers who used the link to access www.audisportline.com
were eventually directed to an “Audisport Boutique and Services” website that sold hats and shirts containing the “Audi
Sport” logo and offered www.audisport.com email services.207
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Audi
on all of its claims and awarded it a permanent injunction.208
On appeal the Sixth Circuit analyzed whether D’Amato
acted with a bad faith intent to profit.209 The Court found that
the fourth bad faith factor, regarding the bona fide noncommercial or fair use of a mark, weighed against D’Amato “because
D’Amato used www.audisport.com to sell merchandise and
email addresses bearing the Audi name, and up until the district court issued the injunction, was selling advertising space
bearing the Audi name.”210 The Court also determined that
D’Amato could not invoke the ACPA’s safe harbor exception211
because:
[A] court should . . . make use of this “reasonable belief” defense very
sparingly and only in the most unusual cases. That is, the court
should place emphasis on the phrase “had reasonable grounds to believe” that the conduct was lawful, focusing primarily upon the objective reasonableness and credibility of the defendant’s professed ignorance of the fact that its conduct was unlawful. Otherwise, every
cybersquatter would solemnly aver that it was entitled to this defense
because it believed that its conduct was lawful.212

Therefore, the Sixth District affirmed the district court’s
summary judgment for Audi.213

207. Id. at 539–40. D’Amato stood to benefit financially from the hyperlinks on his website because he would receive a portion of the sales revenue,
but his website never made any profits. Id. at 540.
208. At the time Audi’s motion for summary judgment was granted,
D’Amato’s website contained a disclaimer noting that “this page is not associated with Audi AG or Audi USA in any way.” Id. at 539, 541 (quoting Audi
AG v. D’Amato, 381 F. Supp. 2d 644, 650 (E.D. Mich. 2005)).
209. Id. at 548; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i) (2006).
210. Audi AG, 469 F.3d at 549.
211. Id. at 548–49; see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2006).
212. Id. at 549 (emphasis in original) (quoting J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS § 25.78 (4th ed. 2004)); see also Harrods Ltd. v.
Sixty Internet Domain Names, 157 F. Supp. 2d 658, 679 (E.D. Va. 2001), aff’d
in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 302 F.3d 214 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[A]ll but
the most blatant cybersquatters will be able to put forth at least some lawful
motives for their behavior. To hold that all such individuals may qualify for
the safe harbor would frustrate Congress’ purpose by artificially limiting the
statute’s reach.”).
213. Audi AG, 469 F.3d at 539.
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F. EIGHTH CIRCUIT
In Coca-Cola v. Purdy, Plaintiffs Coca-Cola Company,
McDonald’s Corp., Pepsico., Inc., The Washington Post Company, and Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive Company, LLC
(collectively Plaintiffs) sued Defendant, William Purdy (Purdy),
for ACPA violations after Purdy registered domain names such
as www.drinkcoke.org, www.mycoca-cola.com, and www.mywashingtontonpost.com, and created websites at those
names.214 Purdy linked these websites to antiabortion websites
containing images of aborted fetuses, suggesting that Plaintiffs
supported abortions.215 The district court entered several preliminary injunctions against Purdy prohibiting him from using
the domain names.216 Purdy then proceeded to register more
than sixty new domain names containing Plaintiffs’ marks,
such as www.gopepsi.org.217
On appeal Purdy argued: (1) that the district court erred in
granting a preliminary injunction against him because Plaintiffs had not demonstrated a strong possibility that they would
succeed on the merits of their claims;218 and (2) the First
Amendment allowed “him to use the domain names at issue to
attract Internet users to websites containing political expression and criticism of the plaintiffs.”219
The Eighth Circuit noted that the key issue was whether
Purdy’s domain names were “identical or confusingly similar to
[Plaintiffs’] marks,” not whether they were “likely to be confused with [Plaintiffs’] domain names.”220 It did not matter that
“confusion about a website’s source or sponsorship could be re-

214. Coca-Cola Co., v. Purdy, 382 F.3d 774, 779 (8th Cir. 2004). Purdy’s
www.my-washingtonpost.com website was virtually identical to the website
maintained
by
Plaintiff,
The
Washington
Post,
located
at
www.mywashingtonpost.com. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 780–82.
217. Id. at 777–82.
218. Id. at 782. A court considers the following four factors when deciding
whether to grant a preliminary injunction: 1) the probability of the movant’s
success on the merits; 2) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; 3) the
balance between this harm and the injury that granting the injunction will
inflict on other interested parties; and 4) whether the issuance of the preliminary injunction is in the public interest. Id. at 782; see also Dataphase Sys.,
Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 114 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
219. Coca-Cola Co., 382 F.3d at 787.
220. Id. at 783; see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii) (2006).
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solved by visiting the website . . . .”221 The court concluded that
Purdy’s domain names were confusingly similar to Plaintiffs’
marks, given Purdy’s intent to profit from such similarities
through the use of unsuspecting Internet users.222
Purdy also asserted that he only used the domain names to
communicate his personal message.223 However, the pertinent
issue was “whether the First Amendment protects a misleading
use of plaintiffs’ marks in domain names to attract an unwitting and possibly unwilling audience to Purdy’s message.”224
In analyzing whether Purdy had a bad faith intent to profit, the court noted that while Purdy had “made some noncommercial or fair use of the plaintiffs’ marks in critical commentary sites accessible under the domain names, prior to the filing
of this lawsuit he principally attached the names to antiabortion websites that made no mention of plaintiffs whatsoever.”225
The Court also determined that Purdy’s website could not be
completely noncommercial because it “directly solicited monetary contributions and offered various antiabortion merchandise for sale.”226 The Court was not persuaded by Purdy’s ar221. Coca-Cola Co., 382 F.3d at 783. The Eighth Circuit relied on People for
the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001)
wherein “the Fourth Circuit found peta.org confusingly similar to PETA’s
mark even though the attached website was a clear parody of the organization,
for ‘an internet user would not realize that they were not on an official PETA
web site until after they had used PETA’s mark to access the web page
‘www.peta.org.’” Id. at 783 (citing People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals,
263 F.3d at 366–67); see also Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc.,
238 F.3d 264, 271 (4th Cir. 2001) ( holding that the domain name “vw.net” was
similar to Volkswagen’s “VW” mark even though attached website advertised
an ISP); Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 497–98
(2d Cir. 2000) (holding that the domain name “sporty’s.com” was confusingly
similar to aviation catalog company’s “Sporty’s” mark even though the website
advertised a Christmas tree farm).
222. Coca-Cola Co., 382 F.3d at 784.
223. Id. at 787.
224. Id. The court also emphasized that the issue on appeal was not
whether Purdy had a First Amendment right “to use the Internet to protest
abortion and criticize the plaintiffs or to use expressive domain names that are
unlikely to cause confusion.” Id. (citing Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d
770, 778 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that the domain name “taubmansucks.com”
was permissible because it removed any confusion as to its source)); see also
Name.Space. Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 585–86 (2d Cir.
2000) (holding that domain names which themselves express a message may
be protected).
225. Coca-Cola Co., 382 F.3d at 785–86.
226. Id. at 786 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IV)).
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gument that his use of Plaintiffs’ marks in his domain names
were a “fair use” and that he reasonably believed his conduct
was protected by the ACPA, given: (1) his pattern of continuing
to create domain names after a preliminary injunction had
been issued; and (2) his conduct in another case where he was
enjoined after creating a website to criticize his former boss.227
Because the “First Amendment does not protect the deceptive
use of domain names that are identical or confusingly similar to
another’s trademarks,” the Court found that Purdy’s conduct
was likely to have violated the ACPA.228
The Eighth District further found that Purdy “registered
many of these domain names . . . to divert Internet users to
websites that could tarnish and disparage their marks by creating initial confusion as to the sponsorship of the attached websites and implying that their owners have taken positions on a
hotly contested issue.”229 The Court commented that the First
Amendment will not shield “the use of a trademark in a domain
name that creates a likelihood of confusion as to the source or
sponsorship of the attached website.”230 While acknowledging
that Purdy had a “right to express his message over the Internet,” the court found that he had “not shown that the First
227. Id. at 788 (citing People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v.
Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 369 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that a defendant “who
acts even partially in bad faith in registering a domain name is not, as a matter of law, entitled to benefit from [the ACPA’s] safe harbor provision”)); see
also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2006).
228. Coca-Cola Co., 382 F.3d at 790. The Eighth District also held that
“[u]se of a trademark in a way that is likely to cause confusion as to the source
or sponsorship or the expression is not protected conduct.” Id. at 791; see S.F.
Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 527–28 (1987)
(holding that the United States Olympic Committee’s property right in the
word “Olympic” can be protected without violating the First Amendment); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 776 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that First Amendment right does not apply to the use of beer manufacturer’s marks in parody that was likely to cause confusion). The court also noted
that
Purdy
was
free
to
register
domain
names
like
www.PurdySupportsPepsi.com to spread his antiabortion message because
such a name would not be “identical or confusingly similar to any of plaintiffs’
marks.” Coca-Cola Co., 382 F.3d at 790–91.
229. Id. at 786 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(V)).
230. Id. at 787 (citing Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, No.
97 Civ. 0629, 1997 WL 133313, at *10–11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997), aff’d No.
97-7492, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 22179 (2d Cir. Feb. 9, 1998) (holding that the
First Amendment does not prevent injunctive relief against use of plannedparenthood.com, because use of the term “planned parenthood” was not part of a
communicative message but was merely used to identify the source of a product)).
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Amendment protects his appropriation of plaintiffs’ marks in
order to spread his protest message by confusing Internet users
into thinking that they are entering one of the plaintiffs’ websites.”231 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order
granting preliminary injunctions against Purdy.232
G. NINTH CIRCUIT
In Interstellar Starship Services, Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., Plaintiff
Interstellar Starship Services (Interstellar) registered the
www.epix.com domain name and created a website at that domain to showcase its electronic pictures and technical abilities.233 Defendant, Epix Incorporated (Epix, Inc.), a manufacturer and seller of imaging hardware, had registered the
“EPIX” trademark in 1990. 234 Epix, Inc. sued Interstellar for
cybersquatting, but after a bench trial, the district court concluded that Interstellar had not violated the ACPA.235 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that Interstellar had not acted
with a bad faith intent to profit when it registered the
www.epix.com domain name and created a website at that domain and affirmed the district court.236

231. Id. at 788 (citing 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25:76 (4th ed. 2000)). The Eighth Circuit opined “Purdy retains multiple lawful avenues of expression, however,
including publication of his ideas over the Internet using nonconfusing domain
names.” Id. at 789. The Eighth Circuit also found that “[t]he right to disseminate criticism on the Internet cannot trump the public’s right not to be deceived by a confusingly similar domain name.” Id. at 789 (alteration in original) (citing 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 25:76 (4th ed. 2000)).
232. Id. at 792. The court distinguished the facts before it from the decisions of the Fifth Circuit in Lucas Nursery & Landscaping, Inc. v. Grosse, 359
F.3d 806 (6th Cir. 2004) and TMI, Inc. v. Maxwell, 368 F.3d 433 (5th Cir.
2004). Neither of the defendants in those cases registered additional infringing domain names, offered to transfer those domain names for consideration,
linked the domain names to websites about issues other than the company’s
business or to websites that solicited donations or sold merchandise, or demonstrated a bad faith intent to profit from their respective plaintiffs’ marks.
Coca-Cola Co., 382 F.3d at 787.
233. Interstellar Starship Services, Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 939–40
(9th Cir. 2002).
234. Id. For purposes of this Article, only the ACPA-related portions of the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Interstellar Starship Services are discussed. See Interstellar Starship Serv., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 184 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1999).
235. Interstellar Starship Services, 304 F.3d at 938.
236. Id. at 947.
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Three years later, the Ninth Circuit decided Bosley Medical
Institute v. KremerPlaintiff Bosley Medical Institute (Bosley)
sued alleged cybersquatter Defendant Michael Kremer (Kremer), a dissatisfied customer, after Kremer registered the
www.BosleyMedical.com domain name and created a website at
that domain to criticize Bosley and report on a prosecutorial investigation of Bosley.237 “Bosley Medical” was Bosley’s registered trademark.238 Kremer maintained a second website at
www.BosleyMedicalViolations.com, which viewers could access
from a link on www.BosleyMedical.com.239 The district court
entered summary judgment in Kremer’s favor and dismissed
Bosley’s ACPA claim after determining that Kremer’s use of
Bosley’s mark was noncommercial.240
On appeal the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s
decision award of summary judgment in Kremer’s favor.241 In
its analysis of whether the ACPA required a cybersquatter to
make a commercial use of a trademark owner’s mark, the Court
concluded that it did not. In doing so, the Ninth Circuit agreed
with the Fifth and Sixth Circuits’ determinations that the
ACPA does not require commercial use of a mark.242 However,
it acknowledged that “[t]he use of a domain name in connection
with a site that makes a noncommercial or fair use of the mark
does not necessarily mean that the domain name registrant
lacked bad faith.”243 The Court also concluded that Kremer’s
237. Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 674 (9th Cir. 2005).
Bosley also sued Kremer for trademark infringement, dilution, unfair competition, various state law claims, and libel. Id. at 674.
238. Id.
239. Bosley
did
not
challenge
Kremer’s
use
of
the
www.BosleyMedicalViolations.com website in the case. Id.
240. Id. at 675.
241. Id. at 674.
242. See DaimlerChrysler v. The Net Inc., 388 F.3d 201, 204 (6th Cir.
2004); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Catalonette, 342 F.3d 543, 546 (6th Cir.
2003); E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs Ltd., 286 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2002).
243. Bosley Med. Inst., Inc., 403 F.3d at 680–81 (quoting Coca-Cola Co. v.
Purdy, 382 F.3d 774, 778 (8th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 106–412, at 11 (1999) (“This factor is
not intended to create a loophole that otherwise might swallow the bill, however, by allowing a domain name registrant to evade application of the Act by
merely putting up a noninfringing site under an infringing domain name.”).
Given that one of the nine bad faith factors is whether one had a “bona fide
non-commercial or fair use of the mark in a site accessible under the domain
name,” the Ninth Circuit noted that such “factor would be meaningless if the
statute exempted all non-commercial uses of a trademark within a domain
name.” Bosley Med. Inst., Inc., 403 F.3d at 681 (citing 15 U.S.C. §
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website was not a commercial one because although it linked to
discussion groups and advertisements, it did not offer any
products or advertisements for purchase.244 Rather, Kremer’s
website simply expressed his views about Bosley’s services.245
The Ninth Circuit also reversed the district court’s award
of summary judgment in Kremer’s favor on two additional
grounds. First, discovery on Bosley’s ACPA claim had not yet
been completed at the time summary judgment was granted.246
Second, the ACPA claim “was not within the scope of the summary judgment motion . . .” and the district court had failed to
notify Bosley that it would rule on the ACPA claim when deciding the motion.247 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that “the
district court [had] erred in granting summary judgment to
Kremer” on the ACPA claim and remanded the claim to the district court for further review.248
H. TENTH CIRCUIT
In 2008 the Tenth Circuit decided Utah Lighthouse Ministry v. Foundation for Apologetic Information and Research, and
articulated a new test for determining when fair use, including
parodies, can survive an ACPA claim.249 Plaintiff Utah Lighthouse Ministry (UTLM) was an organization founded by Jerald and Sandra Tanner whose mission was to criticize the Lat-

1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IV)).
244. Id. at 678 (citing TMI, Inc. v. Maxwell, 368 F.3d 433, 438 (5th Cir.
2004) (holding that the commercial use requirement is not satisfied where defendant’s site had no outside links)). Regarding Bosley’s Lanham Act claim,
the court held that “the noncommercial use of a trademark as the domain
name of a website—the subject of which is consumer commentary about the
products and services represented by the mark—does not constitute infringement under the Lanham Act.” Id. at 674. The court also noted that there were
“no links to any of Bosley’s competitors’ websites” on Kremer’s
www.BosleyMedical.com website. Id.
245. Id. at 678–79. The court emphasized that “trademark rights do not
entitle the owner to quash an unauthorized use of the mark by another who is
communicating ideas or expressing points of view.” Id. at 676 (citing Mattel,
Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
246. Id. at 681 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326 (1986)).
247. Id. at 674, 680.
248. Id. at 672–74, 682.
249. Utah Lighthouse Ministry v. Found. for Apologetic Info. & Research,
527 F.3d 1045, 1048 (10th Cir. 2008).
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ter-day Saints (LDS) church.250 UTLM used its www.utlm.org
website to sell books supporting its mission.251 Defendant
Foundation for Apologetic Information and Research (FAIR),
was an organization with a website that responded to criticisms
of the LDS church.252 Defendant Allen Wyatt (Wyatt), FAIR’s
vice president and webmaster, registered ten domain names
(including www.utahlighthouse.com, www.utahlighthouse.org,
and other various combinations of the words “Utah Lighthouse
Ministry” and the Tanner’s names).253
When viewers visited any of Wyatt’s ten domain names,
they were directed to Wyatt’s own website parodying UTLM’s
www.utlm.org website.254 At the time Wyatt created his parodic
website, “UTAH LIGHTHOUSE” was not a registered trademark.255 Although Wyatt’s website was similar in some respect
to UTLM’s website, it had different yet parallel content.256 For
example, the two websites had lighthouses with black and
white stripes and similar welcome messages for viewers.257
Wyatt’s website also contained the words “Destroy, Mislead,
and Deceive” but did not have a disclaimer indicating it was not
associated with UTLM’s website.258 Rather, UTLM’s welcome
message on its website read “Welcome to the Official Website of
the Utah Lighthouse Ministry, founded by Jerald and Sandra
Tanner,” while Wyatt’s welcome message read “Welcome to an
official website about the Utah Lighthouse Ministry, which was
founded by Jerald and Sandra Tanner.”259
UTLM sued Defendants FAIR and Wyatt (collectively, “Defendants”) for trademark infringement, unfair competition,
trademark dilution, cybersquatting, and trade dress infringement.260 After considering cross motions for summary judgment, the district court entered summary judgment for Defen250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1048–49.
254. Id. at 1049, 1057.
255. Id. at 1050.
256. Id. at 1048–49.
257. Id. at 1049.
258. Id.
259. Id. (emphasis added). Wyatt’s website did not offer any goods, services, or advertising for sale but did include hyperlinks to a Brigham Young University organization, articles criticizing the Tanners, the LDS church website,
and the FAIR homepage. Id.
260. Id.

LAMPKE LF CHECK.WEB (DO NOT DELETE)

308

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

3/9/2010 11:33 AM

[Vol. 11:1

dants on all six claims.261
UTLM appealed the summary judgment ruling only as to
its trademark infringement, unfair competition, and cybersquatting claims.262 UTLM argued: (1) that Wyatt had used the
“UTAH LIGHTHOUSE” mark “in connection with any goods or
services” in part because Wyatt’s website contained hyperlinks
to the FAIR website which sold goods and therefore, Wyatt’s
website was commercial in use; and (2) that Wyatt’s website
was not a parody.263
The district court had held, and the Tenth District agreed,
that Wyatt’s website did not constitute a commercial use because it “provided no goods or services, earned no revenue, and
[did not have] direct links to any commercial sites.”264 Rather,
Wyatt’s website was used in connection with his own commentary about UTLM and his “use of the [UTAH LIGHTHOUSE]
trademark was separated from any goods or services offered for
sale.”265 UTLM also asserted that Wyatt’s website prevented
Internet users from reaching the products sold on its own website.266 The Tenth Circuit disagreed, finding that “the defendant in a trademark infringement and unfair competition case
must use the mark in connection with the goods or services of a
competing producer, not merely to make a comment on the
trademark owner’s goods or services.”267
Finally, UTLM argued that “the overall commercial nature
of the Internet renders the [Wyatt] website itself a commercial
use.”268 The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument, finding that
not all Internet uses are commercial for purposes of the Lanham Act.269 Thus, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Defendants’
use of UTLM’s trademark, UTAH LIGHTHOUSE, was not “in

261. Id. at 1048.
262. Id. at 1050.
263. Id. at 1052, 1056–57. A hyperlink “is an active button or text on web
pages that, when clicked with a mouse, immediately takes the user to some
other web page.” See Nupp, supra note 19, at 656.
264. Id. at 1052 (citing Mem. Decision & Order at 11); see also Bosley Med.
Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding a sequence of links
to advertising did not constitute commercial use).
265. Utah Lighthouse, 527 F.3d at 1052–53 (citing Bosley, 403 F.3d at 679).
266. Id. at 1053.
267. Id. at 1053 (emphasis added).
268. Id. at 1051–52; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).
269. 527 F.3d at 1054.
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connection with any goods or services.”270
As to the issue of whether Wyatt’s website was a parody
and would exempt Defendants from liability under the ACPA,
the Tenth Circuit found that the district court had not erred in
determining that Wyatt’s website was a parody because it did
not cause a likelihood of confusion.271 The Tenth Circuit stated:
A critical parody nevertheless “derive[s] benefit from the reputation of
the owner of the mark . . . [in that] no parody could be made without
the initial mark.” What is critical is that the benefit “arises from the
humorous association, not from public confusion as to the source of
the marks,” so no inference of confusion can be drawn from the intentional use simply as a parody.272

Noting that a parody can succeed only if the trademark at
issue is strong, the Court concluded that Wyatt’s website was a
parody and the likelihood of confusion was minimal.273 It emphasized that “it would be immediately apparent to anyone visiting the Wyatt website that it was not the UTLM website due
to the differences in content . . . as there are sufficient differences between the content and style of the two websites to
avoid the possibility of confusion.”274 Thus, the district court
had properly granted summary judgment in Defendants’ favor
on Plaintiff’s trademark infringement and unfair competition
claims.

270. Id.
271. Id. at 1054–58. The court noted that “[e]ven if Defendants’ use were
determined to be commercial, it would only infringe upon UTLM’s trademark
rights if the use created a likelihood of confusion.” Id. at 1054; see 15 U.S.C. §
1125(a)(1)(A) (2006). A determination of the likelihood of confusion involves
six factors: 1) the degree of similarity between the marks; 2) the intent of the
alleged infringer in using the mark; 3) evidence of actual confusion; 4) similarity of products and manner of marketing; 5) the degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers; and 6) the strength or weakness of the marks. Id. at
1055; see Sally Beauty Co., Inc. v. Beutyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964 (10th Cir. 2002).
In addition, the Tenth Circuit noted that “[p]arody is another factor to consider in determining the likelihood of confusion.” 527 F.3d at 1055.
272. Id. (quoting Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482,
1486 (10th Cir.1987)) (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted).
273. Id. at 1056.
274. Id. at 1056–57. The court also noted that “[a] parody adopts some features of the original mark, but relies upon a difference from the original mark
to produce its desired effect.” Id. at 1057; see Jordache Enters., 828 F.2d at
1486 (“An intent to parody is not an intent to confuse.”); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v.
Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, 886 F.2d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1989) (confusing parodies are “vulnerable under trademark law”); L.L. Bean, Inc. v.
Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 32 n. 3 (1st Cir. 1987) (confusing parodies
“implicate . . . the legitimate commercial and consumer protection objectives of
trademark law”).
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In reviewing the district court’s grant of summary judgment in Defendants’ favor on Plaintiff’s ACPA claims,275 the
Tenth Circuit noted that UTLM had failed to prove that UTAH
LIGHTHOUSE was distinctive at the time Wyatt registered his
domain names.276 However, it found that “. . . utahlighthouse.com and utahlighthouse.org [were] virtually identical to
the trademark with the minor exceptions of spacing between
‘Utah’ and ‘Lighthouse,’ and the addition of the .com and
.org.”277 The Tenth Circuit further found that Wyatt’s website
constituted a fair use “[b]ecause Wyatt’s parody offer[ed] an indirect critique and lack[ed] an overt commercial purpose.”278
Therefore, it concluded that Wyatt had not acted with a bad
faith intent to profit, following “the reasoning of several other
courts that a website that critiques a product and uses the
product’s trademark as the website’s domain name may be a
fair use.”279 In addition, the ACPA’s safe harbor exception further shielded Defendants from liability because “Defendants
could have reasonably believed that use of the domain name [in
a parodic website] was legal.”280 Thus, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in Defendants’ favor on Plaintiff’s ACPA claim.281
275. To prevail on its ACPA claim, UTML had to demonstrate “(1) that its
trademark, UTAH LIGHTHOUSE, was distinctive at the time of registration
of the domain name; (2) that the domain names registered by Wyatt . . . are
identical or confusingly similar to the trademark; [and] (3) that Wyatt used or
registered the domain names with a bad faith intent to profit.” Utah Lighthouse, 527 F.3d at 1057.
276. Id. at 1051.
277. Id. at 1057–58.
278. Id. at 1058.
279. Id.; see Lucas Nursery & Landscaping, Inc. v. Grosse, 359 F.3d 806,
809 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding that consumer registering domain name “lucasnursery.com” and complaining about nursery’s work was not liable under
ACPA); TMI, Inc. v. Maxwell, 368 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that a
website with the purpose of informing other consumers did not create the
harm the ACPA intended to eliminate); Mayflower Transit, L.L.C. v. Prince,
314 F. Supp. 2d 362 (D.N.J. 2004) (finding no ACPA liability where Defendant
registered “mayflowervanline.com” since the totality of the circumstances
demonstrated that registrant’s motive was to express dissatisfaction in doing
business with the mark’s owner).
280. Utah Lighthouse, 527 F.3d at 1059. The ACPA’s safe harbor exception
provides that no bad faith intent can be found if “the court determines that the
person believed and had reasonable grounds to believe that the use of the domain name was a fair use or otherwise lawful.” See 15 U.S.C. §
1125(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2006).
281. Utah Lighthouse, 527 F.3d at 1059.
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I. ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
In Southern Grouts & Mortars, Inc. v. 3M Company, Plaintiff Southern Grouts & Mortars (Southern) sued Defendant 3M
Company (3M), a competitor in the swimming pool finishing
industry.282 Southern owned the trademark “DIAMOND
BRITE,”
but
3M
had
earlier
registered
the
www.diamondbrite.com domain name.283 Like Southern, 3M also had trademark rights in the DIAMOND BRITE mark but
only in connection with “electronically controlled display panels
and signs,” not pool products.284 Even though 3M’s trademark
rights in the DIAMOND BRITE mark expired, 3M continued
its re-registration of the www.diamondbrite.com domain
name.285 The website at that domain briefly displayed content
but ceased doing so after April 2002.286 3M defended its reregistration of the domain name, explaining that it wanted “to
avoid the risk that a competitor of its . . . products would use it
to create consumer confusion as to the source of its products.”287
Southern, which registered and used www.diamondbrite.cc for
its business, subsequently sued 3M for ACPA and unfair competition violations.288 The district court awarded summary
judgment for 3M, finding that Southern had failed to show that
3M had a bad faith intent to profit from its use of the
DIAMOND BRITE mark and failed to show that 3M used the
mark in commerce and failed to produce sufficient evidence of a
likelihood of confusion.289
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit analyzed each of the
ACPA’s nine bad-faith-intent-to-profit factors and found that
five of them weighed in 3M’s favor, two of them weighed in
Southern’s favor, and the remaining two factors, including the
fair use factor, did not apply.290 The Court noted that the Se282. Southern Grouts & Mortars, Inc. v. 3M Company, 575 F.3d 1235, 1238
(11th Cir. 2009).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 1239.
287. Id. at 1238.
288. Southern’s unfair competition claims against 3M were based upon 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a). Id.
289. Id. at 1243, 1249. The additional basis for the district court’s award of
summary judgment in 3M’s favor was the court’s finding that Southern’s
ACPA claims were barred by laches. Id.
290. The Eleventh Circuit found that the third, fifth, sixth, seventh, and
eighth factors weighed in 3M’s favor. The first and ninth factors weighed in
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nate Report which accompanied the ACPA was silent “about
those who hold onto a domain name to prevent a competitor
from using it.”291 The Court concluded that Southern had “not
established that 3M had any intention to profit from the diamondbrite.com website” and affirmed the district court’s
award of summary judgment in 3M’s favor on the ACPA
claim.292
V. WHY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
SHOULD INTERPRET THE FAIR USE DEFENSE OF FREE
SPEECH OR PARODY UNDER THE ACPA.
Since the ACPA’s enactment in 1999, only a handful of federal appellate courts have decided ACPA cases involving a fair
use defense asserted by an alleged cybersquatter. While few in
number, these decisions have resulted in inconsistent criteria
regarding the standard as to when a fair use defense of free
speech or parody will defeat an ACPA claim. Although the
United States Supreme Court has previously decided trademark infringement cases,293 it has yet to grant a petition for a
writ of certiorari in a single ACPA case.294 At least one party
has unsuccessfully petitioned the Court to grant it a writ of cerSouthern’s favor. As to the second factor, the court found that it was inapplicable to the case because “diamondbrite.com [was] not the legal or identifying
name of a person.” It found the fourth factor to be inapplicable as well because
the diamondbrite.com domain name was not used for comparative advertising,
criticism, comment, or parody purposes. Id. at 1249.
291. Id. at 1248.
292. Id. at 1247. Because the Eleventh Circuit found that Southern had
failed to produce sufficient evidence that 3M acted with a bad faith intent to
profit, it did not address the district court’s finding that Southern’s ACPA
claim was barred by laches. Id. at 1249.
293. See, e.g., KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc.,
543 U.S. 111 (2004); Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003);
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992); Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
294. By statute, the United States Supreme Court may review a case from
a federal court of appeals when it grants a writ of certiorari upon the request
of any party in a civil case. 28 U.S.C. § 1254 provides that the United States
Supreme Court may review cases from the federal appellate courts on either of
the following grounds: (1) “[b]y writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of
any party to any civil or criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or
decree; and (2) [b]y certification at any time by a court of appeals of any question of law in any civil or criminal case as to which instructions are desired,
and upon such certification the Supreme Court may give binding instructions
or require the entire record to be sent up for decision of the entire matter in
controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2008).
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tiorari in an ACPA case.295 As described below, the time is ripe
for the United States Supreme Court to interpret the standard
of when the fair use defense of free speech or parody will preclude a finding of liability under the ACPA.
The inconsistent criteria articulated by the circuit courts
on the ACPA’s fair use defense is most evident in the Fourth
and Tenth Circuits. In the 2008 case of Utah Lighthouse Ministry v. Foundation for Apologetic Information and Research,
the Tenth Circuit held that in order for a parody to be considered a “fair use” and defeat an ACPA claim, it must: (1) not
cause a likelihood of public confusion as to the source of the
mark;296 and (2) be immediately apparent to anyone visiting
the parodic website that it was not the trademark owner’s website due to the differences in context.297 However, the criteria
from other circuits courts was not whether the website’s content
immediately conveyed to a viewer that it was the not the
trademark owner’s website. Rather, at least one circuit court
has held that the key issue is whether the domain name itself
conveys that it is a parody.298
For example, the Fourth Circuit’s criteria for determining
whether something is a parody, and thus can be considered a
fair use, is whether the domain name at issue conveys two simultaneous, yet contradictory, messages. First, that it is the
original. Second, that it is not the original and is, instead, a
parody.299 In People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v.
295. Sporty’s Farm, L.L.C. unsuccessfully sought a writ of certiorari from
the United States Supreme Court. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, Sporty’s
Farm, L.L.C., v. Sportsman’s Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489 (2000) (No. 99-1752)
2000 WL 34013464, cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1262 (2000). In its petition, Sporty’s
Farm argued that the Second Circuit, the first federal appellate court to interpret the ACPA had “committed two errors.” First, the Second Circuit had
improperly substituted its factual finding for those of the district court under a
set of standards, specifically the ACPA, not in effect at the time the district
court issued it decision. Second, it argued that the Second Circuit had improperly taken Sporty’s Farm’s property in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Id.
296. Utah Lighthouse Ministry v. Found. for Apologetic Info. and Research,
527 F.3d 1045, 1055 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg
Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1486 (10th Cir. 1987)).
297. Id. The Tenth Circuit noted that “[t]he district court [properly] determined that the Wyatt website was a parody because it would be immediately
apparent to anyone visiting the Wyatt website that it was not the UTLM website due to the differences in content.” Id. at 1056–1057 (emphasis added).
298. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d
359, 366 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell
Publ’g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1989)).
299. Id. (emphasis in original).
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Doughney, the Fourth Circuit rejected Doughney’s argument in
which he asked the court to “consider his website [at
www.peta.org] in conjunction with the domain name
[www.peta.org] because, together, they purportedly parody
PETA.”300 The Fourth Circuit found that Doughney’s
www.peta.org domain name conveyed the first message (that it
was the original) but that “the second message [that it was not
the original but is instead a parody, was] conveyed only when
the viewer read[] the content of the website.”301 Because “an internet user would not realize that they were not on an official
PETA web site until after they had used PETA’s mark to access
the web page ‘www.peta.org,’ ” the Fourth Circuit held that
Doughney’s use of www.peta.org was not a parody and found
him liable for violating the ACPA.302 Such criteria conflicts
with the criteria rendered by the Tenth Circuit.
There also appears to be an inconsistency within the
Fourth Circuit itself as to the standard for the fair use defense
in an ACPA case. For example, given the Fourth Circuit’s criteria above in PETA, if a parody relies on a user visiting a website to determine whether he or she is on an official website
sponsored by a mark holder, then alleged cybersquatter, Christopher Lamparello, in Lamparello v. Falwell, should have lost.
Instead, the Fourth Circuit entered summary judgment in favor of Lamparello even though Lamparello registered the domain name, www.fallwell.com and created a website at that
domain to criticize Reverend Jerry Falwell.303 Certainly, the

300. Id. at 366.
301. Id. at 367. While Doughney argued that his website content delivered
the second required message needed to successfully constitute a parody, the
Fourth Circuit disagreed, stating that it is the domain name (and not the website content) which must convey the first and second simultaneous, yet contradictory, messages. Id. at 366; see also Morrison & Foerster LLP v. Wick, 94 F.
Supp. 2d 1125, 1134–35 (D. Colo. 2000) (contending that defendant’s use of
plaintiffs’ mark in domain name “does not convey two simultaneous and contradictory messages” because “[o]nly by reading through the content of the
sites could the user discover that the domain names are an attempt at parody”); Planned Parenthood Federation of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 97 Civ. 0629, 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3338, at *33 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1997), aff’d, No. 97-7492,
1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 22179 (2d Cir. Feb. 9, 1998) (rejecting the parody defense because “[s]eeing or typing the ‘planned parenthood’ mark and accessing
the web site are two separate and nonsimultaneous activities”).
302. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 263 F.3d at 366–67 (quoting Doughney, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 921).
303. Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 322 (4th Cir. 2005).
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domain name www.fallwell.com appears to convey the message
that it is the original. However, it does not convey the second
message, that it is not the original but instead is a parody. Only
after one visited the website content at www.fallwell.com could
one
determine
that
Lamparello
intended
to
use
www.fallwell.com as a parody.304 Therefore, under the Fourth
Circuit’s
criteria
in
PETA,
Lamparello’s
use
of
www.fallwell.com should not have been determined to be a fair
use, and he should have been held liable for cybersquatting. Instead, Lamparello prevailed in the Fourth Circuit.305
Similarly, under the Fourth Circuit’s criteria in PETA, the
alleged cybersquatter in the Tenth Circuit case of Utah Lighthouse Ministry should have lost, but instead he prevailed.306 A
user might very well be aware of the UTAH LIGHTHOUSE
mark, see the www.utahlighthouse.org domain name, and reasonably believe that if he or she typed in the domain name, he
or she would be visiting a website sponsored by, or affiliated
with, UTAH LIGHTHOUSE.
Only after arriving at the
www.utahlighthouse.org website would a viewer actually realize that it was not a UTAH LIGHTHOUSE website, but instead
was a parody.
This Article has exposed the inconsistent criteria articulated by the circuit courts as to when the fair use defense of
free speech or parody will defeat an ACPA claim. Given these
inconsistencies, which have the ability to impact the fair use
defenses in broader trademark arenas, the United States Supreme Court should interpret the standard as to when a fair
use defense of free speech or parody will preclude a finding of
liability under the ACPA.

304. Id. at 318.
305. Lamparello, 420 F.3d at 322.
306. Utah Lighthouse Ministry v. Found. for Apologetic Info. and Research,
527 F.3d 1045, 1059 (10th Cir. 2008).

